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HIS article provides an update of judicial and legislative develop-
ments of franchise law in Texas and the Fifth Circuit during the
Survey period. Relevant case law from around the country that
impacts franchise businesses is also included.
II. MISREPRESENTATION, DISCLOSURE
AND REGISTRATION
A. WHAT IS A FRANCHISE?
The Texas Business Opportunity Act' ("Texas BOA") contains disclo-
sure and registration rules for business opportunities sold or leased in
Texas. 2 The Texas BOA defines three types of business opportunities:
Any sale or lease of goods or services, for initial consideration to
franchisor (or its affiliate) of more than $500, used by the purchaser to
begin a business, in which the seller represents that purchaser will make a
profit, where seller represents that it will either: (a) provide locations or
assist purchaser in finding locations; (b) provide a production, sales or
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marketing program; or (c) buy back or will be likely to buy back goods
purchased or products made from goods made by purchaser from the
goods initially purchased or leased by purchaser from seller.3
One of the exceptions to the Texas BOA registration and disclosure
requirements is a franchise, as defined by 16 C.F.R. Section 436.2(a), so
long as the franchisor materially complies with all requirements of the
statute and each order and action of the Federal Trade Commission and,
before offering or selling any franchise in Texas, files a proper notice with
the secretary of state.4
16 C.F.R. § 436.2 contains the trade regulation rule of the Federal
Trade Commission setting forth "Disclosure Requirements and Prohibi-
tions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures" ("the
FTC Rule"). The FTC Rule defines two types of franchises. First, a per-
son (franchisee) sells goods or services that are significantly associated
with the franchisor's mark and franchisor exerts significant control over
or provides significant assistance to franchisee's method of operation, and
franchisee is required as a condition of commencing the business, to
make a payment (or commitment to make a payment) of $500 or more to
franchisor (or its affiliate), before or within six months of commencing
operations. 5 Second, a person (franchisee) sells goods or services sup-
plied by franchisor or its affiliates, and the franchisor secures locations,
retail outlets, accounts, or rack displays or provides the services of a per-
son able to do either, and franchisee is required as a condition of com-
mencing the business, to make a payment (or commitment to make a
payment) of $500 or more to franchisor (or its affiliate), before or within
six months of commencing operations. 6
A January 2000 Informal Staff Advisory Opinion indicates that the
FTC may construe nearly any payment of (or a commitment to pay) $500
or more by a franchisee (buyer) to a franchisor (seller), before or within
the first six months of operations, to constitute the required payment ele-
ment of a franchise. 7 The situation before the FTC involved a company
in the business of developing a chain of quick service restaurants that it
represented to prospective purchasers as "turnkey" restaurant opera-
tions. The company acknowledged that its Operation Agreement satis-
fied the first prong of the "franchise" definition-significant trademark
association and control or assistance. Because the company required no
up-front franchise or license fee, it sought an opinion that its Operation
Agreement was not a franchise, and should not be governed by the FTC
Rule. The Advisory Opinion determined, however, that at least three
types of payments being made by the operator (putative franchisee) to
3. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 41.004(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
4. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 41.004(b)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2001); 16 C.F.R.
§ 436.2(a) (2000).
5. 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a)(1)(i) (2000).
6. 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a)(1)(ii) (2000).
7. Informal Staff Advisory Opinion 00-2 (Jan. 24, 2000) 2 Bus. Franchise Guide
(CCH) $ 6506 (Jan. 24, 2000).
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the company (putative franchisor) would or could constitute the required
franchise payment, so the business relationship should be treated as a
franchise.
The Operation Agreement required the operator to pay a "working
capital deposit" of $5,000 to the company before opening a restaurant.
This deposit (minus any expenses incurred by the company for the opera-
tion of the restaurant that the operator failed to pay) would be returned
to the operator at the termination or expiration of the Operation Agree-
ment. The Advisory Opinion determined that this deposit alone would
constitute a franchise fee, stating, "That some or all of this deposit may be
returned to the investor is irrelevant." 8 The Advisory Opinion deter-
mined that a second type of fee that the operator was required to pay to
the company, monthly lease fees of $1,200 for the restaurant premises
and $750 for equipment, would constitute the required franchise pay-
ment, as well. Citing the Interpretive Guides to the Rule, the Advisory
Opinion noted that the Commission made clear that the term "required
payment" was intended to "capture all sources of revenue which the fran-
chisee must pay to the franchisor ... for the right to associate with the
franchisor and market its goods or services."9
Additionally, the Advisory Opinion stated that certain service charges
that the company might receive for its performance of certain accounting
functions for the operator (conditioned upon the operator experiencing
profits) could also constitute the required payment needed for a
franchise. The Advisory Opinion stated, "There is no question that a
commitment to pay continuing fees to the franchisor for the right to con-
duct business (such as royalties), as well as future shares of profits, may
constitute a required payment for Rule purposes." 10 The Advisory Opin-
ion goes on to clarify that the FTC rule does not require the amount of
the recurring fees to be fixed at the time the franchise agreement is exe-
cuted. It held that depending upon the nature of the franchisor's busi-
ness, a prospective franchisor might reasonably anticipate paying this
company at least $500 in "operating service charges" during the first six
months of operations; so, such payment could also constitute a minimum
required payment. 1
The FTC seems to interpret the "payment" requirement more broadly
than courts have in cases brought by franchisees. Although Texas does
not have any recent cases interpreting the term "payment," prior to the
issuance of the January 2000 Advisory Opinion, an Indiana court con-
firmed the traditional analysis that, to constitute a franchise fee under the
Indiana Franchise Act, the fee must be a required, non-recoverable, firm-
specific investment in another party, and required for the right to conduct
8. Id. at 9727.





the business. 12 The Indiana court specifically held that a franchise fee
could not be an ordinary business expense because "[t]he statute defines
a franchise fee as a fee paid for the right to do business, not as fees paid
during the course of business."'1 3 Best (the putative franchisee) argued
that its payments to Seyfert for purchasing, maintaining, and replacing
display racks for snack foods were actually indirect franchise fees. The
Indiana court held that these payments were ordinary business expenses
that did not constitute a franchise fee. 14 The court rejected Best's argu-
ment that the cost of the racks was not a recoverable business expense
because Seyfert set the retail prices for all retail goods. The Court held
that even though Best could not raise its prices to recover the expense of
the racks, because the racks promoted the sale of the goods, they most
likely increased overall sales. The court also held that purchasing the
racks was not "required" by Seyfert, since Seyfert had never indicated
that it would terminate Best if it did not provide and maintain the racks.15
The court also denied Best's claim that the amount it paid (to a third
party) for warehouse space was an indirect franchise fee, stating that this
was an ordinary business expense and not paid to the seller. 16
In Bestest Int'l, Inc. v. Futrex, Inc.,17 the plaintiff alleged that it paid
$30,000 to Futrex, Inc. (the putative franchisor) for the right to do busi-
ness, and this amount constituted a "franchise fee." The court found that
the evidence showed that a previous distributor of medical equipment for
Futrex (Norick) had financial problems, owed Futrex money for goods
previously purchased and desired to sell its distribution rights to the pred-
ecessor of plaintiff. Futrex agreed that Norick could sell its Distribution
Agreement to plaintiff's predecessor as long as Norick paid its past due
balance to Futrex. Plaintiff's predecessor paid a substantial portion of
the past due amount directly to Futrex (Norick paid the balance to Fu-
trex). In rejecting plaintiff's interpretation of the payment, the court
noted that the California Commissioner had previously held that "[a]
payment to or for the account of third parties not affiliated with the
franchisor is not a 'franchise fee'." 18
B. REGISTRATION
The Sixth Circuit held that a franchisor's significant involvement in the
transfer process could make it become the party to actually "offer or sell"
the franchise under South Dakota's franchise registration statute requir-
12. Best Distrib. Co. v. Seyfert Foods, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
13. Id. at 1201 (quoting Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128, 136 (7th
Cir. 1990)).
14. Id. at 1203.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1203-04.
17. 2 Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11,915 (C.D. Cal. August 14, 2000).
18. Id. (citing Premier Wine & Spirits of S.D., Inc., v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 644 F.
Supp. 1431, 1438-39 (E.D. Cal. 1986)).
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ing the franchisor to be properly registered in the state. 19 Here, Little
Caesar's (franchisor's) financial analyst encouraged the prospective fran-
chisee to purchase the franchises, arranged financing with a lendor for the
franchise purchases, and strategized with the prospective franchisee on
how to structure the purchases. A different franchisor employee acted as
the "go between" to negotiate the purchase terms between the prospec-
tive franchisee and the then current franchisee. Because, at the time of
the sale of the franchises, Little Caesar's registration was expired in
South Dakota, the Court upheld the district court's recission of the
franchise agreements. 20
C. DISCLOSURE AND MISREPRESENTATION
1. Disclosure Obligations of Business Brokers
The FFC staff clarified its position as to when business consultants,
who were not employees of a franchisor but offered their clients a variety
of business options including franchises, became "brokers" under the
Franchise Rule and when their initial meetings with their clients became
"first personal meetings."'21 The two specific situations addressed in-
volved a franchise consulting firm ("Frannet") and a business broker firm
("Tom Miller"). Both companies had their clients complete forms that
contained information that was very similar to a typical franchise applica-
tion.22 Frannet obtained information from consumers in order to educate
them about potential business opportunities and evaluate their goals and
potential risks. Frannet had contracts with approximately 75 franchisors
who would pay it a fee if a referred franchise prospect purchased a
franchise. Frannet's literature discussed franchising at length and its pri-
mary source of income came from generating franchise sales. Tom
Miller's primary concern was to sell on-going businesses, and not
franchises, to its clients. 23 It acknowledged, however, that if a business
client failed to qualify for the existing businesses that were for sale, but
did qualify for franchise opportunities, its brokers may provide the pros-
pect with written historical and overview information (with no earnings
claims made) regarding one or more franchise systems. If a prospect was
interested in any of the franchises, the Tom Miller broker would provide
the name of the prospect to the franchisor and would have no further
discussions regarding the franchise opportunity.24
Advisory Opinion 99-7 stated that a face-to-face meeting between a
franchise prospect and a non-employee of a franchisor constituted a "first
19. Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. OPPCO, LLC, 2 Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH)
11,897 (6th Cir. July 14, 2000).
20. Id.
21. Informal Staff Advisory Opinion 99-7, [1998-2000 Transfer Binder] 2 Bus.
Franchise Guide (CCH) 6504 (November 12, 1999).
22. Id. at 9721, 9722.




personal meeting" when a franchisor's representative or independent
agent:
(a) received a commission or other compensation if a franchise sale
was ultimately consummated;
(b) met personally with consumers in a setting where there was a
likelihood or expectation of discussing the possible purchase of a
franchise, and during the meeting the representative;
(c) sought to match the consumer with one or more specific
franchise systems based upon criteria furnished by the consumer;
(d) discussed the merits of one or more specific franchise systems;
and
(e) contacted the franchisor on behalf of the consumer or otherwise
advised the consumer on how to contact one or more franchise
systems. 25
Advisory Opinion 99-7 held that both Frannet and Tom Miller quali-
fied as "brokers" under the FTC rule. It further held that Frannet's ini-
tial meetings with clients appeared to be first personal meetings because
Frannet met with prospects specifically to discuss franchise opportunities,
not simply to discuss the idea of franchising as a business method. It held
that initial meetings by Tom Miller brokers did not appear to be first
personal meetings because the discussions of franchising were only inci-
dental, at best, and that any franchising discussions would only occur if
the purchase of a listed business was not an option for the prospect. 26
The Advisory Opinion specifically stated that its opinion would be differ-
ent if Tom Miller advertised new franchise units, instead of only resales
by existing franchisees, because this would change the expectations of its
clients at the first meeting.27
D. PRE-CONTRACT MISREPRESENTATIONS AND EARNINGS CLAIMS
1. FTC Actions
The court refused to modify two Commission orders to specifically
limit the franchisor's liability for deceptive advertising or marketing activ-
ities by franchisees, if the franchisor distributed copies of the orders to all
franchisees, contractually bound franchisees to follow the orders, and
used best efforts to obtain compliance by franchisees and licensees.2 8 In
denying the request, the FTC noted that the orders did not make the
franchisor strictly liable to franchisees, so vicarious liability would be de-
termined on a case by case basis.
On September 10, 1999, the FTC announced the filing of a consent
decree with a photo sticker vending machine franchisor that was charged
with failing to provide prospective franchisees with basic disclosure docu-
ments and making earnings claims (verbally and in writing) without pro-
25. Id. at 9723.
26. Id. at 9724.
27. Id.
28. In the matter of Gen. Nutrition Corp., [1998-2000 Transfer Binder] Bus. Franchise
Guide (CCH) $ 11,787 (January 31, 2000).
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viding required earnings claim disclosures. 29 The defendant and its
affiliates were (a) ordered to pay a civil penalty of $11,000; (b) enjoined
from promoting, offering to sell, or selling any business opportunity or
venture similar to the "Sticker Club" venture, unless they came into com-
pliance with the FTC Rule; (c) enjoined from making any false, mislead-
ing statements or implications to any purchasers of any business,
opportunity, or venture; and (d) ordered to retain certain records regard-
ing on-going business activities.30
On September 20, 1999, the FTC announced the filing of a consent
decree with the primary owner of an automotive lubricant product dis-
play rack marketer, who was charged with making material misrepresen-
tations to prospective purchasers in violation of the FTC Act, and with
failing to provide such purchasers with proper disclosure documents or
documentation for the earnings claims made, as required by the FTC
rule. 31 The marketer and its primary owner allegedly represented that
the purchasers should expect to receive (a) specific earning levels; (b)
substantial profits; (c) reliable, company selected references; (d) specific
territorial protection; and (e) certain advertising assistance.32 The FTC
alleged that all of these representations were false and that the earnings
and profits representations were not substantiated or properly docu-
mented. The franchise owner was enjoined against selling or promoting
any business opportunity, franchise, or business venture, and against
making misrepresentations in connection with the marketing or sale of
any goods or services. He was also ordered to comply with a series of
reporting and record keeping requirements. 33 In addition, a $4,000,000
consumer redress judgment was issued against the owner, but this judge-
ment was suspended, subject to a financial investigation, unless the owner
was found to have misrepresented the nature and amount of his assets.
On August 8, 2000, the FTC announced its filing of a July 31, 2000
complaint and the subsequent issuance of a temporary restraining order
against two corporate sellers of car wash franchises and their principals.
34
The FTC claimed that defendants promised but failed to provide purchas-
ers with a "turnkey" restaurant operation, substantial start-up and on-
going assistance, marketing support, and equipment, in violation of the
FTC Act prohibition against false and deceptive representations. The
FTC further claimed that the defendants promised (either directly or im-
pliedly) that potential purchasers could expect to achieve specific reve-
nues and substantial profits and that most purchasers did not ever earn
such earnings or profits. Some purchasers were given no earnings claim
29. U.S. v. PVI, Inc., [1998-2000 Transfer Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH)
11,702 (S.D. Fla. September 10, 1999).
30. Id.
31. U.S. v. QX Int'l, Inc., [1998-2000 Transfer Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH)
11,703 (N.D. Tex. September 20, 1999).
32. Id. at 32, 230.
33. Id. at 32, 231-34.
34. FTC v. The Car Wash Guys Int'l, Inc., 2 Bus. Franchise Guide CCH) 11,921
(C.D. Cal. July 31, 2000).
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document, and some purchasers were given a disclosure document that
stated that defendant did not make any earnings representations. The
FTC asserted that defendants' promises of specific earnings and/or profits
constituted false and deceptive representations, in violation of section 5
of the FTC Act 35 and that defendants' failure to provide an earnings
claim document to prospective purchasers constituted a violation of the
FTC's Franchise Rule. 36 Most surprising, however, the FTC also asserted
that the instances where defendants provided prospective purchasers with
a disclosure document stating that defendants made no earnings claim
constituted violations of section 436.1(f) of the FTC rule, which prohibits
the making of any statement that contradicts the disclosure document.
The FTC obtained a restraining order restraining defendants from violat-
ing the FTC Rule or FTC Act and sought a permanent injunction, dam-
ages, and costs. 37
2. State Actions
a. Actionable Misrepresentations
The elements of a Texas fraud action are that (1) a material representa-
tion was made; (2) it was false; (3) the speaker knew that it was false
when made; (4) it was made with the intent of inducing reliance; (5) the
other party relied upon it; (6) damages were incurred, and, in the case of
a promise to act in the future; (7) the promisor had no intention of per-
forming when he made the promise.38 Although there were no Texas
franchise cases on point during the Survey period, the Sixth Circuit and
U.S. District Courts in Massachusetts and California re-affirmed this
standard over the past year.
In determining that certain statements by Learning Express
(franchisor) constituted actionable misrepresentations, the Massachusetts
U.S. District Court looked at the specific statements made by Learning
Express. 39 The franchisee claimed that Moore, the Learning Express rep-
resentative, told him that "he would be able to provide the necessary sup-
port to allow the [franchisee] to establish a Learning Express franchise
retail store in New Jersey and to make it a success" 40 and that another
representative of Learning Express stated that "Moore was experienced
and was able to assist [the franchisee] in finding an appropriate location,
as well as provide them with the training and knowledge necessary to
open and successfully operate a Learning Express franchise. '41 The court
ruled that the very specific wording of promises made by franchisor (that
35. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000).
36. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(b)-(e) (2001).
37. See The Car Wash Guys, 2 Bus. Franchise Gude (CCH) at 33, 459.
38. See Ensley v. Cody Res., Inc., 171 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1999), reh'g denied en banc,
181 F.3d 98 (5th Cir. 1999).
39. Learning Express, Inc. v. Ray-Matt Enters., Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D. Mass.
1999).




Learning Express would be able to provide sufficient support to allow
success) constituted promises or factual assertions sufficient to support
franchisee's allegations of misrepresentation and fraud. The court further
held that, because the alleged statements were' consistent with the
franchise agreement provisions promising training and support, the fran-
chisee's reliance upon such statements was reasonable. 42 The court
therefore overruled the dismissal of the misrepresentation claim against
Learning Express and held that franchisee would have 30 days to re-plead
his fraud allegations.
The Texas result, with facts identical to the Learning Express case,
would probably also allow franchisee to proceed with the fraud claim.
Texas law holds that the promise of future performance may be consid-
ered the basis of a misrepresentation claim if the speaker did not intend
to perform or knew his statement was untrue at the time of the statement,
or if the speaker had specialized knowledge of facts that would or could
occur in the future.43
A California U.S. District Court held that, although any misrepresenta-
tions regarding sales or profits that could be expected by the franchise
prospect were non-actionable opinions, any statements regarding the
profitability of existing stores would be actionable representations of fact.
The court further held statements by franchisor employees, that they
were experienced and would provide assistance to franchisee in training
and identifying a location, might be held by the fact finder to constitute
actionable statements of fact, so he denied summary judgement on this
point. 44
A franchisor's alleged representations to prospective pizza restaurant
franchisees, that the existing pizza outlets in K-Mart stores would not
complete with the franchisee and would actually enhance the franchisees'
performance, were held to be actionable misrepresentations by the Sixth
Circuit.45 The court held that the representations were as to past, future,
and current events, and only the future representations constituted non-
actionable representations. The court held that franchisor had instituted a
policy of restricting such outlets within one-mile of a franchised restau-
rant raised the inference that franchisor knew that the representations
were false. In rejecting defendant's allegation that the representations by
franchisor's sales employee were not actionable statements but were
mere expressions of opinion by the employee, the court found that (1) the
statements were specific and capable of verification; (2) franchisor's em-
ployee had specialized knowledge and authority; and (3) franchisee did
42. Id.
43. Clardy Mfg. Co. v. Marine Midland Bus. Loans, Inc., 88 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1996),
reh'g and sugg. for reh'g denied en banc, 96 F.3d 1447 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1078 (1997) (emphasis supplied).
44. California Bagel Co. v. Am. Bagel Co., [Transfer Binder 1998-2000] Bus. Franchise
Guide (CCH) 11,880 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2000).
45. Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. OPPCO, L.L.C., [1998-2000 Transfer Binder] 2 Bus.
Franchise Guide 11,897 (6th Cir. July 14, 2000).
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not have any prior experience in dealing with the subject of the K-Mart
outlets, so had less specialized knowledge than the speaker.46
b. Estoppel and Reasonable Reliance Defenses to
Misrepresentation Claims
Despite FTC's broad allegations in The Car Wash Guys, courts have
seemed willing to grant motions for summary judgment against franchisee
claims of pre-sale misrepresentation and fraud when the franchise agree-
ment executed contains (1) a broad integration clause and (2) an ac-
knowledgment by franchisee that franchisor has made no pre-sale
representations that are not specifically set forth in the franchise agree-
ment.47 In Cook v. Little Caesar Enters., Inc.,48 franchisee claimed that it
was promised that it would have an exclusive territory encompassing
most of Fresno, California. Each Little Caesar franchise agreement that
franchisee executed contained an integration clause, an acknowledgment
that franchisee had no knowledge of representations contrary to the
terms of the franchise agreements, and stated that franchisee had an ex-
clusive territory of one mile from each franchise. 49 The Sixth Circuit af-
firmed dismissal of the misrepresentation and fraud allegations for two
reasons. First, it held that, even if the statements were misrepresenta-
tions, reliance would not be reasonable, since the representations were
contrary to the acknowledgments by franchisee in his franchise agree-
ment.50 Second, the court, noting that there was no evidence that the
statements were made in bad faith or were untrue when made, held that
the statements were not misrepresentations because the alleged state-
ment that franchisee would be given a large exclusive territory was a fu-
ture promise, and a fraudulent misrepresentation claim must be based
upon past or present facts.51 The court held that although the future
promises could be contractual, a breach of contract claim would fail since
the parol evidence rule would prohibit evidence of the alleged verbal
promises that conflicted with the express terms of the franchise
agreement.
Despite the FrC's contention in The Car Wash Guys, the courts have
also, thus far, continued to hold that a disclosure document statement
that franchisor makes no earnings claims may protect a franchisor from
franchisee allegations of unauthorized pre-sales earnings claims.52 In
granting defendant's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff's
fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, the court held that a fran-
chisee could not have reasonably relied upon alleged oral representations
46. Id.
47. See Cook v. Little Caesar Enters., Inc., 210 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 2000); California
Bagel Co., 2 Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) $ 11,880.
48. 210 F.3d 653 (6th Cir. 2000).
49. Cook, 210 F.3d at 654.
50. Id. at 658.
51. Id.
52. See California Bagel Co., 2 Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) T 11,880.
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of franchisor's employees regarding the profits of its existing franchisees.
The Offering Circular provided to the prospective franchisee specifically
stated that "American Bagel does not furnish or authorize its sales per-
sons to furnish any oral or written information concerning the actual or
potential sales, costs, income, or profit of a Chesapeake Bagel Bakery.
Actual results vary from unit to unit and American Bagel can not esti-
mate the results of any particular franchise. '53
III. CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF FORUM
The use and enforcement of forum selection clauses in commercial con-
tracts have increased dramatically since the United States Supreme
Court's decision in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,54 which held
that forum selection clauses are valid and enforceable as long as enforce-
ment would not be unreasonable. Despite this decision and the fact that
most state courts have held that such clauses are valid and enforceable, 55
53. Id.
54. 407 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1972).
55. E.g., Prof'l Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347 (Ala. 1997); Volkswagenwerk,
A.G. v. Klipann, 611 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1980); Societe Jean Nicolas et Fils, J.B. v. Mousseux,
597 P.2d 541 (Ariz. 1979); ABC Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Harvey, 701 P.2d 137 (Colo. Ct. App.
1985); Phoenix Leasing, Inc. v. Kosinski, 707 A.2d 314 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998); Elia Corp. v.
Paul N. Howard Co., 391 A.2d 214 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978); Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d
437 (Fla. 1986); Antec Corp. v. Popcorn Channel, L.P., 482 S.E.2d 509 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997);
Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 773 P.2d 1143 (Idaho 1989); Homer v. Tilton, 650
N.E.2d 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Vanier v. Ponsoldt, 833 P.2d 949 (Kan. 1992); Prezocki v.
Bullock Garages, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1997); Lejano v. Bandak, 705 So. 2d 158 (La.
1997); Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Baker, 673 A.2d 1336 (Me. 1996); Gilman v. Wheat, First Sec.,
Inc., 692 A.2d 454 (Md. 1997); Jacobson v. Mailboxes Etc. U.S.A., Inc., 646 N.E.2d 741(Mass. 1995); Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab Indus., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 886
(Minn. 1982); High Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 823 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1992);
Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y v. Yelich, 549 N.W.2d 172 (Neb. 1996); Tandy Com-
puter Leasing v. Terina's Pizza, Inc., 784 P.2d 7 (Nev. 1989); Dancart Corp. v. St. Albans
Rubber Co., 474 A.2d 1020 (N.H. 1984); Brooke Group Ltd. v. JCH Syndicate 488, 663
N.E.2d 635 (N.Y. 1996); Perkins v. CCH Computax, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1992); Ken-
necorp Mortgage Brokers, Inc. v. Country Club Convalescent Hosp., Inc., 610 N.E.2d 987
(Ohio 1993); Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810 (Pa. 1965);
Bakhsh v. Jacrrc Enters., Inc., 895 P.2d 746 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995); Prows v. Pinpoint Retail
Sys., Inc., 868 P.2d 809 (Utah 1993); Chase Commercial Corp. v. Barton, 571 A.2d 682 (Vt.
1990); Paul Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Cannon U.S.A., Inc., 397 S.E.2d 804 (Va. 1990); Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Keyser, 275 S.E.2d 289 (W. Va. 1981); Durdahl v. Nat'l Safety Assocs., Inc., 988 P.2d
525 (Wyo. 1999).
Federal courts have also held such clauses to be valid and enforceable. E.g., M/S
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1972); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Crescent Int'l, Inc. v. Avatar Communities, Inc. 857 F.2d 943
(3rd Cir. 1988); Int'l Software Sys., Inc. v. Amplicon, Inc., 77 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 1996); M.B.
Rests., Inc. v. CKE Rests., Inc., 183 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 1999); Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci
Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1988); Smith v. Prof'l Claims, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1276(M.D. Ala. 1998); Reo Sales, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 925 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Colo.
1996); Res. Ventures, Inc. v. Res. Mgmt. Int'l, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 423 (D. Del. 1999);
Amermed Corp. v. Disetronic Holding AG, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 1998); Talatala v.
Nippon Yusen Kaisha Corp., 974 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Haw. 1997); Deans v. Tutor Time Child
Care Sys., Inc., 982 F. Supp. 1330 (S.D. Ind. 1997); Fed. Gasohol Corp. v. Total Phone
Mgmt., Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (D. Kan. 1998); Creditors Collection Bureau, Inc. v. Ac-
cess Data, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 311 (W.D. Ky. 1993); Rooney v. Biomet, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d
126 (D. Mass. 1999); Knutson v. Rexair, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 214 (D. Minn. 1990); Galli v.
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there continues to be litigation concerning the enforcement of such
clauses at both the state and federal level. In addition, because many
franchisors require that their franchise agreements contain forum selec-
tion clauses, much of the recent litigation has been in the franchisor-fran-
chisee context. This Survey period was no exception as courts at both the
state and federal level reviewed the enforcement of forum selection
clauses in the context of the franchisor-franchisee relationship.
A. ENFORCEMENT OF FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
1. State Cases
The Wyoming Supreme court held that forum selection clauses are
prima facie valid in Durdahl v. Nat'l Safety Assocs., Inc. 56 In Durdahl, a
distributor filed suit against a manufacturer in Wyoming ignoring the fo-
rum selection clause in the parties' agreement naming Shelby County,
Tennessee as the exclusive jurisdiction for adjudicating disputes involving
the agreement between the parties. 57 The court rejected the distributor's
arguments against enforcing the clause. The court held, in part, that mu-
tuality of obligation cannot be a defense when a contract is supported by
adequate consideration.5 8 The fact that causes of action arose prior to
the execution of a forum selection clause did not affect the validity of the
forum selection clause as the parties can limit the forum in which a cause
of action will be brought after the cause of action has materialized. 59 The
court also held that the forum selection clause did apply to fraud claims,
as they arose out of the contractual relationship. 60 Finally, the court re-
fused to speculate whether the parties were able to negotiate and held
that in the absence of contrary evidence, the contract was not a contract
of adhesion.61
In Texas, an appellate court enforced a forum selection clause at the
request of the franchisee, despite claims that the rights to enforce the
clause were waived. In Wallpapers To Go, Inc. v. Brennan,62 the
franchisor brought suit in Texas state court for breach of the franchise
agreement. The franchise agreement contained a forum selection clause
that provided litigation between the parties could only be brought in the
Travelhost, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1260 (D. Nev. 1985); Republic Mortgage Ins. Co. v.
Brightware, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 482 (M.D.N.C. 1999); Shell v. R.W. Sturge Ltd., 850 F.
Supp. 620 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Bryfogle v. Carvel Corp., 666 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Pa. 1987);
Scott v. Guardsmark Sec., 874 F. Supp. 117 (D.S.C. 1995); Tex. Source Group, Inc. v. CCH,
Inc., 967 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Berrett v. Life Ins. Co. of the Southwest, 623 F.
Supp. 946 (D. Utah 1985); JPS Elastomerics Corp. v. Indus. Tools, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 376
(W.D. Va. 1998); Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fort Lauderdale P'ship, 740 F. Supp. 1483 (W.D.
Wash. 1990); P.M. Enters. v. Color Works, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 435 (S.D. W. Va. 1996).
56. 988 P.2d 525 (Wyo. 1999).
57. Id. at 526.
58. Id. at 528-29.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 529.
61. Id.
62. No. 14-98-00482-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 7237 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
Sept. 30, 1999) (not designated for publication).
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federal district court nearest to the then-current home office of
franchisor.63 The court rejected the franchisor's argument that the fran-
chisee had waived the right to enforce the forum selection clause, holding
that the franchisor was attempting to turn a contractual issue into a juris-
dictional issue. 64 The court found that the franchisee did not waive its
right to enforce the forum selection clause by filing a special appearance
and not filing a motion to remove. The court also held that franchisee
followed the proper procedure in first withdrawing his special appearance
and then filing a motion to dismiss. The court held that franchisee's mo-
tion to dismiss was the proper vehicle for invocation of the forum selec-
tion clause.65 The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal and enforced
the forum selection clause.
In B & R Mgmt. & Leasing Corp. v. Triarc Rest. Group,66 the New
York Supreme Court enforced a similar forum selection clause; however,
the choice of forum was applied only to those causes that were related to
the franchise agreements. In B & R Mgmt., the franchisor terminated
four franchises for failure to make contractually-fixed contributions to an
advertising cooperative. The franchise agreement contained a forum se-
lection provision that provided any suit must be filed where franchisor's
principal office was then located. 67 The court held it was the policy of
New York to enforce contractual forum selection provisions in the ab-
sence of a showing of fraud, overreaching, unreasonableness or unfair-
ness, or that enforcement would contravene a strong public policy.68 The
court enforced the forum selection clause but dismissed only those causes
of action that related to the franchise agreements as plaintiff failed to
present sufficient evidence to invalidate the clauses.69
Finally, in Pepe v. GNC Franchising, Inc.,70 the court upheld a forum
selection clause as to those causes of action not protected by Connecticut
statute. The franchisee filed suit in Connecticut alleging breach of con-
tract, unfair trade practice, violations of Connecticut statutes, and viola-
tion of Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Act. The franchisor moved
to dismiss based upon the forum selection clause requiring that the case
be brought in Pennsylvania.71 The court noted that the general rule in
Connecticut is that a forum selection clause is valid and enforceable "ab-
sent a strong showing that it should be set aside." 72 However, a Connect-
icut statute protects a franchisee's right to bring action under certain
63. Id. at *2.
64. Id. at *6.
65. The court noted that the franchisee did not submit to the jurisdiction of the state
court prior to filing its motion to dismiss. Franchisee entered only a special appearance and
did not conduct discovery until after withdrawing the special appearance and filing a mo-
tion to dismiss.. Id. at *8.
66. 269 A.D.2d 804 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
67. Id. at 805.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 750 A.2d 1167 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000).
71. Id. at 1168.
72. Id. at 1167-68.
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Connecticut statutes in Connecticut state court. As franchisees asserted a
claim for violation of statutes protected by the Connecticut law, the court
refused to dismiss that claim. The court did, however, dismiss all other
claims pursuant to the forum selection clause as the franchisee failed to
present any evidence of fraud or overreaching. The court noted that, had
the Connecticut legislature wished to invalidate all forum selection
clauses, it could have easily done so. 73 Thus, the enforcement of the fo-
rum selection clause as to all other claims was not contrary to public
policy.
2. Federal Cases
Two cases in the Survey period limited the reach of Kubis & Perszyk
Assocs., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc.7 4 In Kubis, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court held that forum selection clauses selecting another state are
presumptively invalid in franchise cases. The New Jersey District Court
first limited the reach of Kubis in Cadapult Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Tek-
tronix, Inc.75
In Cadapult, the agreement between the parties contained a forum se-
lection clause mandating that any litigation be brought in Oregon. The
plaintiff filed suit in New Jersey claiming violation of the New Jersey
Franchise Practices Act on a different agreement, breach of contract, and
various federal and state statutory violations. 76 The defendant moved to
dismiss or transfer the case based on the forum selection clause. The
court held that a forum section clause in diversity cases is interpreted by
federal law. While state policy is a factor in evaluating the forum selec-
tion clause's validity, it is not dispositive.77 The plaintiff argued that
under the holding in Kubis, the forum selection clause would violate
strong public policy in New Jersey. The court disagreed, holding that
Kubis was limited to cases in which a "plaintiff asserts a valid claim under
the Franchise Practices Act."'78 The court held that plaintiff failed to
bring valid claims under the Franchise Practices Act. The court addition-
ally examined whether the forum selection clause was invalid due to une-
ven bargaining positions. The court held that the "fear" of plaintiff to
negotiate the agreement's provisions with Tektronix did not substantiate
an uneven bargaining position.79 Thus, the court enforced the forum se-
lection clause and transferred the case to Oregon.
The second case that limited the reach of Kubis was Park Inn Int'l,
L.L.C. v. Mody Enters., Inc.80 In Park Inn, a hotel franchisor filed suit
against a franchisee in federal court in New Jersey for breach of the
73. Id. at 1169.
74. 680 A.2d 618 (N.J. 1996).
75. 98 F. Supp. 2d 560 (D.N.J. 2000).
76. Id. at 562.
77. Id. at 565.
78. Id. at 566.
79. Id. at 568.
80. 105 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D.N.J. 2000).
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franchise agreement. The franchise agreement included a forum selec-
tion clause designating New Jersey as the proper forum for disputes. The
franchisee moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for im-
proper venue. The court held that where the validity of a clause is chal-
lenged, it is analyzed under state law.81 The court noted that forum
selection clauses are commonly found to be prima facie valid and en-
forceable when the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act is not implicated.
The court held the instant case was not subject to the New Jersey
Franchise Practices Act as the Act "applies only[] to a franchise[ ] the
performance of which contemplates or requires the franchisee to estab-
lish or maintain a place of business within the State of New Jersey.182
Furthermore, the court held that the presumption in Kubis is inapplicable
to out-of-state franchise agreements. New Jersey public policy will not
support an extension to out-of-state agreements, nor would such an ex-
tension further the purposes of the statute.83
The franchisee's other claims were rejected. The court held that the
failure to read a contract will not excuse enforcement of its provisions. In
addition, the court held that the absence of negotiations over the clause
will not affect the provision's validity. Finally, the court rejected a claim
that the clause was unfair due to the franchisee's lack of sophistication,
noting that the franchisee successfully owned and operated several hotels.
Consequently, the court found the forum selection clause valid and en-
forceable and that defendants thereby contractually consented to the ju-
risdiction of New Jersey courts.
The last federal case in the Survey period to enforce a forum selection
clause employs the analysis in MIS Bremen.84 The court in Eisaman v.
Cinema Grill Sys., Inc.,85 followed the analysis in MIS Bremen after deter-
mining that Georgia law, the law selected in the choice of law provision,
applied to the forum selection clause. The court first examined whether
the forum selection clause was mandatory or permissive. 86 While the
clause at issue could be considered permissive as to the franchisor, who
was given authority to choose the jurisdiction of any suit, the court con-
cluded that the provision was mandatory because it required franchisee
to submit to the jurisdiction chosen by the franchisor. 87 Second, the court
determined that enforcement would be reasonable in the instant case.
The court dismissed the claims without prejudice to refile in the contrac-
tual forum.
81. Id. at 373 (citing Gen. Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352,
356-57 (3d Cir. 1986)).
82. Id. at 374 (brackets in the original).
83. Id.
84. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
85. 87 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D. Md. 1999).
86. Id. at 449.
87. Id. at 450.
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B. REFUSAL TO ENFORCE FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
1. State Cases
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court had an opportu-
nity to address the enforcement of forum selection clauses in a mandamus
proceeding styled In re GNC Franchising, Inc.88 Unfortunately, the ma-
jority of the court chose not to provide any such clarification and denied
the mandamus without stating its reasons. However, a dissenting opinion
authored by Justice Hecht and joined by Justice Owen did provide gui-
dance on how the court might address the issue in the future.
In re GNC Franchising involved a dispute between four Texas franchis-
ees and their franchisor, GNC Franchising, Inc., a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion.89 The franchise agreements between the parties provided that any
action brought by the franchisee against the franchisor shall be brought
only within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in the judicial district in
which the franchisor has its principal place of business.90 Despite the fo-
rum selection clauses, the franchisees and their respective business enti-
ties filed suit in a district court in Houston, Texas, against GNC
Franchising, Inc., a related GNC entity and two individual GNC employ-
ees (collectively GNC). The petition alleged causes of action for fraudu-
lent inducement, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act and the Texas Free Enterprise and
Antitrust Act.91 In response, GNC filed a motion to dismiss the franchis-
ees' claims pursuant to the forum selection clause designating Penn-
sylvania as the forum for any actions brought by a franchisee. 92 The
district court denied the motion, and GNC filed Petition of Writ of Man-
damus in the First District Court of Appeals. 93 The Court of Appeals
denied the petition in a one page opinion but did not state the reasons for
the denial.94 GNC subsequently filed its Petition for Writ of Mandamus
with the Texas Supreme Court. A majority of the Texas Supreme Court
denied the Petition but did not state the reason for the denial; thus, the
88. 22 S.W.3d 929 (Tex. 2000). The majority of Texas appellate courts have found
forum selection clauses to be generally enforceable. E.g., Abacan Technical Servs. Ltd. v.
Global Marine Int'l Servs. Corp., 994 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1999, no pet.); Southwest Intelecom, Inc. v. Hotel Networks Corp., 997 S.W.2d 322, 324
(Tex. App.- Austin 1999, pet. denied); Accelerated Christian Educ., Inc. v. Oracle Corp.,
925 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no writ); Busse v. Pacific Cattle Feeding Fund
#1, Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 807, 812-13 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied); Greenwood v.
Tillamook Country Smoker, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1993, no writ); Barnette v. United Research Co., 823 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1991, writ denied).
89. In re GNC Franchising, 22 S.W.3d at 929.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 930.
92. Id.
93. In re GNC Franchising, Inc., No. 01-99-01013-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 7022




reason for the denial is open to speculation. 95 The dissenting opinion,
authored by Justice Hecht and joined by Justice Owen, stated that the
forum selection clauses at issue were valid and enforceable and that the
trial judge's decision was subject to mandamus. The dissent further ad-
dressed the arguments raised by the franchisees against enforcement of
the forum selection clauses.
The franchisees argued that the forum selection clauses were invalid
because the franchisees had alleged that the franchise agreements were
fraudulently induced. The dissent, citing the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,96 noted that in order for
a forum selection clause to be rendered invalid by fraud, the clause itself
must be fraudulently induced. 97 The dissent further stated that "any
other rule would permit the party to a contract to escape a forum selec-
tion provision merely by asserting a misrepresentation relating to some
aspect of the agreement." 98 In a related argument, the franchisees also
argued that the forum selection clauses should not apply to the tort and
statutory claims they had asserted. In response the dissent stated:
Some Texas courts have stated that forum-selection clauses should
not apply to tort and statutory claims,99 but others have indicated
that such claims are subject to a forum-selection clause if they arise
out of the parties' contractual relationship. 100 The latter courts are
correct; otherwise a party could escape a forum-selection clause
merely by adding some noncontractual claim to his pleadings.' 0 '
The franchisees claimed that the expense and inconvenience to them of
litigation in Pennsylvania makes the enforcement of the forum selection
clauses unreasonable. The dissent responded by stating that:
But there is no indication that it would not be at least as expensive
and inconvenient for GNC to litigate in Texas. If they read their
agreements when they signed them, as must be assumed, the fran-
chisees knew that they were obligating themselves to litigate disputes
with GNC in Pennsylvania. The fact that they no longer like the deal
is no more reason to excuse them from the forum-selection clause
than from any other provision of their agreements.' 0 2
Finally, the dissent contended that the trial court's decision was subject
to mandamus arguing that even if GNC prevailed after a trial on appeal,
95. In re GNC Franchising, 22 S.W.3d at 929.
96. 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974).
97. In re GNC Franchising, 22 S.W.3d at 930.
98. Id.
99. Citing Southwest Intelecom, Inc. v. Hotel Networks Corp., 997 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied); Busse v. Pacific Cattle Feeding Fund #1, Ltd., 896 S.W.2d
807 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied); Pozero v. Alfa Travel, Inc., 856 S.W.2d 243
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, no writ).
100. Citing Accelerated Christian Educ., Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 925 S.W.2d 66 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1996, no writ); Greenwood v. Tillamook Country Smoker, Inc., 857 S.W.2d
654, 657 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); Barnette v. United Research Co.,
823 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
101. In re GNC Franchising, Inc., 22 S.W.3d at 930.
102. Id. at 931.
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it would have lost forever the right for which it contracted. 10 3 The dissent
reasoned that an agreement to have disputes resolved in the courts of a
certain state is no different from an agreement to have disputes resolved
by arbitration, and the refusal to enforce an agreement to arbitrate is
subject to mandamus.10 4
2. Federal Cases
Texas federal courts have enforced forum selection clauses in the
franchisor-franchisee context,10 5 but the analysis has been fact specific.
As seen in this Survey period, varied facts can result in the court refusing
to enforce the clause even though the court has found the clause to be
valid. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
recently refused to enforce just such a forum selection clause in Brock v.
Baskin-Robbins USA Co. 10 6
In Brock, a diversity action, approximately forty-seven Baskin-Robbins
franchisees (including the shareholders of certain corporate franchisees),
located in New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama sued
Baskin-Robbins Co. and Baskin-Robbins, Inc. in Texas. Their suit al-
leged thirteen causes of action including fraud, fraud in the inducement,
claims under various state consumer protection laws, intentional interfer-
ence with contractual relations, breach of implied covenants of good faith
and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion. 10 7 In response,
Baskin-Robbins filed a motion to dismiss with respect to certain plaintiffs
based on forum selection clauses contained in the parties' franchise
agreements and a motion to transfer venue with respect to the remaining
plaintiffs whose franchise agreements did not contain a forum selection
clause.'0 8
In reviewing the motion, the court first set out the standard for seeking
the enforcement of a forum selection clause where jurisdiction is based
on diversity. The court stated:
Therefore, in the context of a federal court sitting in diversity, when
a forum selection clause allows the parties to bring the action in an-
other federal court and venue is proper under section 1391 in the
district court where the action is presently pending, the district court
should apply the standards of section 1404(a) rather than the stan-
dard in Bremen.109
However, before the court applied the relevant factors to the 1404(a)
analysis, the court first made a determination as to whether or not the
forum selection clauses were valid. Relying on Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272-73 (Tex. 1992)).
105. See Brock v. Entre Computer Ctrs., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 428, 431 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
106. 113 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
107. Id. at 1080.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1084 (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28-29 (1988)).
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Co,110 the court noted that fraud will not invalidate a forum selection
clause unless the inclusion of the forum selection itself was the product of
fraud or coercion."' Under this analysis, the court held that the clauses
were valid even in light of the plaintiffs' claims that they signed the
franchise agreements in duress.11 2 The court next applied the 1404(a)
factors to the facts of the case.
In reviewing the 1404(a) factors, the court first focused on the relative
bargaining power of the parties. Based on various affidavits from certain
plaintiffs, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were in no position to
bargain. 1 3 Although the court stated that this fact alone was not disposi-
tive, it did reduce the weight the court gave the forum selection
clauses.114 In addition, the court recognized a problem with the forum
designated by the forum selection clauses at issue. The clause appeared
to designate the principal place of business of Baskin-Robbins as the ap-
propriate forum, but later references listed the Middle District of Califor-
nia as the principal place of business. However, at the time of the
litigation, Baskin-Robbins' principal place of business had changed to
Massachusetts. 1 5 In addition, the court noted that Baskin-Robbins had
not provided evidence concerning the inconvenience to the witnesses if
the case were to remain in Texas. These facts again weighed against en-
forcement of the clause because Baskin-Robbins was arguing for a trans-
fer to California. The court next rejected Baskin-Robbins' arguments
concerning the accessibility of the proof. Baskin-Robbins had argued
that most of the documents would be located in California and Massachu-
setts and that many depositions would be out of state. The court stated
that it failed to see how these facts would support a transfer to California.
The court further took into account the fact that some of the plaintiffs'
franchise agreements did not contain forum selections clauses and this
fact weighed heavily in favor of retaining the case in Texas." 6 The court
finally reviewed the public interest factors finding that they favored keep-
ing the case in Texas." 7 Based on this analysis, the court held that Bas-
kin-Robbins failed to carry its burden and show the court that the case
should be transferred to California. The court summarized it analysis by
stating:
While a majority of the Plaintiffs have a valid forum-selection clause
in their contracts, these contracts were not the result of equal bar-
gaining power. Furthermore, other than the forum-selection clause,
Defendants have presented no evidence to the Court indicating that
the Middle District of California is more convenient or less burden-
110. 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974).
111. Brock v. Baskin-Robbins USA Co., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1087 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1087-88.
114. Id. at 1088.
115. Id.
116. Brock v. Baskin-Robbins USA Co., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1089-90 (E.D. Tex.
2000).
117. Id. at 1090-91.
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some. Evidence presented by the Plaintiffs, on the other hand, tends
to demonstrate that it is a less convenient forum. Plaintiffs identified
several key witnesses who reside in Texas. Several of these witnesses
and many Plaintiffs live within driving distance of the Court. These
facts, along with the inequality of bargaining power between the
Plaintiffs and Defendants, tend to neutralize the presumption set up
by the forum-selection clauses.
Other factors favor keeping the case in the Eastern District of Texas.
The Plaintiffs whose contracts do not contain forum-selection clauses
are entitled to have their choice of forum honored, and judicial econ-
omy is best served by keeping these cases together. In addition, the
citizens of the Eastern District have a substantial interest in the out-
come of this case as it affects the lives of their fellow citizens.1 18
The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss and transfer and it did
not enforce the forum selection clauses.
In California, a federal district court refused to enforce a forum selec-
tion clause contained in a GNC franchise agreement because the clause
contravened California's strong public policy against such provisions.11 9
In response, GNC Franchising, Inc. petitioned for permission to appeal
the district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1292(b) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 5. Permission was
granted.'2 0 In Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., the Ninth Circuit began its
analysis by stating that federal law governs the analysis of the effect and
scope of forum selection clauses in diversity cases.12 1 The court stated
that it had previously held that the rules set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. would control
the consideration of a motion to dismiss for improper venue based on a
forum selection clause. In further discussing the Bremen decision, the
court noted that the Supreme Court previously held that "a contractual
forum selection clause is unenforceable if enforcement would contravene
a strong public policy of a forum in which suit is brought, whether de-
clared by statute or by judicial decision.1122 The strong California public
policy at issue in the case was a statute in the California Business and
Professional Code which provides: "A provision in a franchise agreement
restricting venue to a forum outside this state is void with respect to any
claim arising under or relating to a franchising agreement involving a
franchise business operating within this state."'21 3 In reviewing this stat-
ute, the Ninth Circuit found that the statute stated a strong California
state interest against forcing California franchises to litigate in non-Cali-
fornia forums due to forum selection clauses.124 The court therefore held
118. Id. at 1091.
119. Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 2000).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing M/S Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
123. Id. (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 20040.5 (West 1997)).
124. Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d at 498.
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that the district court did not err in its refusal to enforce the forum selec-
tion clause. In this regard the court stated:
We conclude and hold that § 20040.5 expresses a strong public policy
of the state of California to protect California franchisees from the
expense, inconvenience, and possible prejudice of litigating in a non-
California venue. A provision, therefore, that requires a California
franchisee to resolve claims related to the franchise agreement in a
non-California court directly contravenes this strong public policy
and is unenforceable under the directives of Breman.125
Accordingly, the court upheld the district court's order denying GNC's
motion to dismiss or transfer the action.
IV. CHOICE OF LAW
Courts continue to apply the approach in Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 187(2), or a variation thereof adopted by the state, in
determining the validity of a choice of law provision in franchise agree-
ments. The Restatement allows for enforcement of a choice of law provi-
sion, provided: (1) there is a substantial relationship between the chosen
forum and the parties or transaction; or (2) enforcement would not vio-
late a fundamental public policy of the state with the greatest material
interest in the particular issue.
In Michigan in Grand Kensington, LLC v. Burger King Corp.,126 the
court denied a franchisor's motion to dismiss based on the choice of law
provision. The court examined the validity of the provision under the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2) adopted by Michigan. 127
The court noted that it must be cautious when invalidating a choice of law
provision and that a difference in result depending upon which law is
applied does not show a violation of a state's fundamental public policy.
Under the Restatement's analysis, the court first determined that a
substantial relationship existed with the chosen forum, Florida, because
the defendant maintained its corporate headquarters there. 28 The court
then compared the franchise statutes of Michigan129 and Florida,1 30 fo-
cusing on whether application of the Florida law would "substantially
erode 'the quality of protection that the MFIL would otherwise ap-
ply.' ,,131 The court concluded that under Florida law, the plaintiffs would
be unable to maintain a cause of action. Furthermore, the plaintiff would
125. Id.
126. 81 F. Supp. 2d 834 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
127. The Michigan Franchise Investment Law does not invalidate choice of law provi-
sions. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 445.1527 (West 1989); Banek Inc. v. Yogurt Ventures,
U.S.A., Inc., 6 F.3d 357, 360 (6th Cir. 1993).
128. Grand Kensington, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
129. Michigan Franchise Investment Law, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1505 (West
1989).
130. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.416(2) (West 2000).
131. Grand Kensington, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 838 (quoting Banek Inc., 6 F.3d at 362).
2001] 1497
SMU LAW REVIEW
not fall within the literal interpretation of the Florida statute. 132 The
court concluded that the protections afforded to the franchisee would be
substantially eroded by the application of Florida law and would, there-
fore, contravene a fundamental public policy of Michigan. The court in-
validated the choice of law provision and applied Michigan law. 133
The district court in New York also refused to enforce a choice of law
provision in LaGuardia Ass'n v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc.134
LaGuardia involved a hotel franchise agreement designating Tennessee
law as the applicable law. The court began its analysis by observing that
in determining the validity of a choice of law provision in a diversity case,
the state law of the jurisdiction should be used. Under New York law, a
contract dispute must be governed by the law of the state with the most
significant contacts to the contract. 135 However, the New York rule gives
way to a contractual choice of law provision provided that the selected
state has a substantial relationship to the parties or transaction and en-
forcing the chosen state law will not violate fundamental New York pub-
lic policy.
The court concluded that Tennessee did not have a substantial relation-
ship to the parties or the transaction. The court noted that Holiday
drafted the agreement, naming Tennessee law in the choice of law provi-
sion. Tennessee, at the time the contract was formed, was the home-state
of Holiday. However, Holiday later moved its corporate headquarters to
Atlanta, Georgia, eliminating the necessary contact for enforcement of
the choice of law provision.136 The court held that the "'reasonable rela-
tionship' of the chosen state to the agreement must exist at the time of
the contract dispute, and not merely at some period in the past. ' 137 The
court concluded that no hardship would be suffered by refusal to enforce
the provision as Holiday itself authored the provision and eliminated its
validity through its own actions.
Finally, in an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit enforced a choice
of law provision in Mail Boxes Etc., USA, Inc. v. Considine.138 The choice
of law provision stated: "This agreement is to be construed under and
132. Id. at 839. While the literal interpretation limits those protected by the statute to
Florida franchisees, the court held that whether the courts would allow plaintiff to avail
himself of the statute was questionable. However, three out of four district courts in Flor-
ida permitted a non-Florida franchisee to avail themselves of the Florida statute. Dickin-
son v. Executive Bus. Group, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1395, 1397 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (Texas
franchisee may have valid claim under FFA); Burger King Corp. v. Holder, 844 F. Supp.
1528, 1531 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (FFA applies since Franchisor does business in Florida); Burger
King Corp. v. Austin, 805 F. Supp. 1007, 1022-23 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (Because choice of law
provided for application of Florida law, FFA applies). But see Barnes v. Burger King
Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1441, 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (FFA applies only to persons who conduct
business in Florida).
133. Grand Kensington, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 839-40. The court determined Michigan law
was proper using the analysis of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188(2).
134. 92 F. Supp. 2d 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
135. Id. at 127 (citing Schwimmer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 176 F.3d 648, 650 (2d Cir. 1999)).
136. Id. at 127-28.
137. Id. at 127 (emphasis omitted).
138. No. 99-35901, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16185 (9th Cir. July 11, 2000).
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governed by the laws of the State of California except where inconsistent
or in conflict with the laws of the State of Washington. '139 The court
noted that in diversity cases, the federal courts use the state conflicts law
of the jurisdiction. Applying Washington conflicts law, the court noted
Washington law enforced express choice of law provisions, unless to do so
would violate a fundamental public policy of the state.140 The court ex-
amined Washington law and determined it did not have a fundamental
public policy regarding covenants not to compete, which formed the basis
of the dispute.' 41
The courts, however, are not always in agreement. In Fendi S.r.l. v.
Condotti Shops, Inc.,142 the court addressed the relationship between a
choice of law provision and a forum selection provision in a franchise
agreement. In Fendi, the franchise agreement between an Italian leather
goods manufacturer and a boutique contained both a forum selection
clause and a choice of law clause. The agreement called for all disputes
or controversies arising from "the interpretation and the execution of
[the] contract" to be interpreted under Italian law and brought in the
courts in Rome.' 43 The Florida Court of Appeals held that the validity of
the forum selection clause must be determined using the law of the fo-
rum, not the law of the forum chosen in the agreement. The court relied
on a majority of jurisdictions that have held the question of a forum selec-
tion clause's validity is a procedural question, determined through appli-
cation of the law of the forum. 144 The court also noted that the Florida
Supreme Court, in Manrique v. Fabbri, 45 applied the law of the forum in
determining the validity of a forum selection clause where both forum
selection and choice of law provisions were included in a licensing agree-
ment. 146 Thus, the court concluded that, when confronted with combined
forum selection and choice of law provisions, Florida courts must "con-
strue the forum selection clause without reference to the choice of law
provision."'1 47
In direct contrast, the court in Eisaman v. Cinema Grill Sys., Inc.148
held that the validity of a forum selection clause should be determined
under the law of the forum chosen in a connected choice of law provision.
The court concluded that when the parties choose the law of a particular
139. Id. at *4.
140. Id. at *5.
141. The court also examined California law, the law of the chosen forum, and deter-
mined that California did have a public policy that invalidated covenants not to compete.
See Scott v. Snelling & Snelling, 732 F. Supp. 1034, 1039-40 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
142. 754 So. 2d 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
143. Id. at 756.
144. Id. at 757-58 (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988); Yamada
Corp. v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 712 N.E.2d 926 (II1. App. Ct. 1999); Bense v.
Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc., 683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1982); Scheck v. Burger King
Corp., 756 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Fla. 1991)).
145. 493 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1986).
146. Fendi, 754 So. 2d at 758.
147. Id.
148. 87 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D. Md. 1999).
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forum in the contract they intend that the contract provision will be inter-
preted under that chosen forum's law.
V. NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS & OTHER
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Covenants not to compete will be enforced in Texas only if they are (1)
ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the agree-
ment is made and (2) reasonably limited as to time, geographical area,
and scope of activity to be restrained so as to not impose a greater re-
straint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or business interest of
promisee. 149
In Snelling & Snelling, Inc. v. Ryvis, Inc. ,15 a franchisor was denied a
preliminary injunction to stop a former franchisee from competing in the
personnel placement services business in violation of the express terms of
the post-termination obligations of the franchise agreement. 151
Franchisor sought a preliminary injunction to enforce the following obli-
gations: (1) for a two year period, franchisees not solicit clients or em-
ployees whom they served or employed; (2) franchisees relocate any
continuing personnel business to a location at least 10 miles from their
former franchised location; (3) franchisees return all franchise materials;
(4) franchisees discontinue the use of "snellingusa" in the search compo-
nents of their web site; and (5) franchisees assign to franchisor their
telelphone and fax numbers and related listings. Without expressing an
opinion on the terms of the franchisor's covenant not to compete, the
court held that because the franchisor was not active in the franchisees'
market area, the franchisor faced no irreparable injury from the defend-
ants' continued operation of the personnel placement services. Citing
DFW Metro Line Servs. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,152 the Court held
that, "[w]here monetary damages would adequately compensate a plain-
tiff, a showing of irreparable injury is precluded."'1 53 The court did go on
to state that if franchisor decided actually to enter the two markets in
which defendants' new business was located during the next two years, it
could then seek injunctive relief, but that the "mere possibility that Snell-
ing may enter a market is inadequate, however, to demonstrate a substan-
tial threat of irreparable injury.' 54 The court concluded that the
defendants' failure to turn over the franchise materials, telephone and fax
numbers, and related listings would constitute irreparable harm, if they
failed to return such information to franchisor within fourteen days of its
order.
149. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
150. No. 3:99-CV-2028-D, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17928 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 1999).
151. Id.
152. 901 F.2d 1267, 1269 (5th Cir. 1990).
153. Snelling & Snelling, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17928, at *5-6.
154. Id. at *11 n.7.
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VI. ENDING THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
In addition to contractual or common law requirements limiting rights
to terminate, franchisors must also comply with statutes governing
franchises in particular industries. For example, in Texas, distribution,
sale, and leasing of motor vehicles are governed by the Texas Motor Vehi-
cle Commission Code.155 The Act provides that "[u]nless otherwise spe-
cifically provided by Texas law not in conflict with the terms of this Act,
all aspects of the distribution and sale of motor vehicles shall be governed
exclusively by the provisions of this Act. '156
Vehicle manufacturers are prohibited from terminating or refusing to
continue any franchise with a dealer unless certain conditions are met.1 57
A manufacturer seeking to terminate or refuse to continue a franchise
must provide its franchisee with written notice not less than 60 days
before the effective date of termination or noncontinuance setting forth
the specific grounds for termination or noncontinuance. Further, the
manufacturers must inform the dealer that he may be entitled to file a
protest with the Board. 158 If the affected dealer files a timely protest, the
Board must hold a hearing to determine whether the franchisor has es-
tablished by a preponderance of the evidence that there is good cause for
the proposed termination or noncontinuance.1 59 In determining whether
good cause has been established for "modifying, replacing, terminating,
or refusing to continue a franchise, or for forcing or attempting to force a
dealer to relocate or discontinue a line-make or parts or products related
to that line-make," the Board must consider "all the existing circum-
stances," including:
(A) the dealer's sales in relation to sales in the market;
(B) the dealer's investment and obligations;
(C) injury or benefit to the public;
(D) the adequacy of the dealer's service facilities, equipment, parts
and personnel;
(E) whether warranties are being honored by the dealer;
(F) the parties' compliance with the franchise agreement; and
(G) the enforceability of the franchise agreement from a public policy
standpoint.160
If the franchise is terminated or not continued, another franchise in the
same line-make must be established within a reasonable time unless the
Board determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the commu-
nity cannot reasonably support such a dealership. 61
155. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36) (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 2000).
156. Id. 93.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
157. Id. § 5.02(b)(3)(A).
158. Id. § 5.02(b)(3)(A)(i)-(iii).
159. Id. § 5.02(b)(3)(A)(iv).
160. Id. § 5.02(b)(5).
161. Id. § 5.02(b)(3)(C).
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Ford Motor Co. v. Motor Vehicle Bd. of the Texas DOT162 involved the
extent to which the Texas Motor Vehicle Board had authority to order a
remedy short of unconditional termination. Plaintiff Metro Ford Trucks,
Inc. ("Metro") was a licensed Ford dealer. Ford had a competitive price
assistance ("CPA") program to reduce wholesale delivery prices below
street prices. Prompted by a complaint from another dealer, Ford au-
dited Metro's CPA program and discovered that Metro had been apply-
ing for CPA in the name of one customer while actually selling the truck
to another customer, thereby securing higher amounts of CPA than those
to which it otherwise would have been entitled. The auditor recom-
mended that Metro reimburse Ford the difference between the CPA al-
lowances received by Metro and those to which it was entitled. The
estimated chargeback was $3.1 million. Ford's regional sales manager
recommended the Metro franchise be terminated for fraud. Metro sued
Ford for breach of contract and antitrust violations. Ford counterclaimed
for fraud. The district court granted Metro a temporary restraining order
preventing Ford from terminating Metro's franchise and from collecting
any chargebacks. Ultimately, the district court dissolved the restraining
order and dismissed Metro's request for injunctive relief to prohibit Ford
from issuing a notice of termination. Metro then filed a request for an
interlocutory cease and desist order with the Board of Motor Vehicles,
arguing that Ford's proposed chargeback and termination violated the
Motor Vehicle Commission Code which prohibits vehicle manufacturers
from terminating a dealer without good cause. 163 The Board issued a
statutory stay prohibiting Ford from terminating Metro's franchise. The
Board later entered an agreed order removing any reference to termina-
tion in the interlocutory cease and desist order and Ford initiated termi-
nation proceedings.
During the hearing before the Board, Ford announced that it was sell-
ing certain assets of its truck division to Freightliner. The admihistrative
law judge ("AL") found that Freightliner was a necessary party to the
administrative proceeding and ordered Freightliner to offer Metro a
franchise. Freightliner tendered a franchise agreement to Metro under
protest. The ALJ ultimately ruled that Ford had established good cause
to terminate Metro's franchise and that the termination of Metro's
franchise should be conditioned on the sale of the dealership to a buyer
selected by Ford and Freightliner at a price established by an independent
appraiser. All parties sought review of the Board's order. The district
court affirmed the Board's order in part, but held that the forced sale
remedy was unlawful. All parties appealed the district court's order.
Metro challenged the ALJ's finding of good cause to terminate. Ford
challenged the judgment remanding the case to the Board to fashion a
new remedy and the Board's finding that Ford was not entitled to recover
chargebacks. Freightliner challenged the order to sell trucks to Metro or
162. 21 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.).
163. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 5.02(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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to help Metro to find a buyer for its franchise. The Board argued the
remedy it imposed on the parties was lawful.
Metro challenged the Board's determination that Ford had good cause
to terminate under Sections 5.02(b)(5)(C) and (F) of the Motor Vehicle
Code because Metro's abuse of its CPA program had injured the public
and violated the Ford-Metro franchise agreement. Metro contended that
there was no evidence to support the finding that the CPA program abuse
resulted in injury to the public. The court found that because Metro had
submitted false customer names to Ford in applying for its CPA al-
lowances, Ford was unable to send safety recall information to actual
owners of the trucks sold by Metro and that, therefore, there was sub-
stantial evidence to support the finding that Metro's CPA program abuse
resulted in injury to the public.
Next, Metro argued that Ford should be estopped from seeking to ter-
minate Metro's franchise because Ford personnel induced Metro sales-
men to violate the franchise agreement by submitting misleading
information to Ford. The court found good cause for termination had
been established because Metro knew that its CPA program abuse was
contrary to Ford policy but approved use and concealment of these
abuses from Ford. The court concluded that by applying for CPA in
names other than actual customers, not providing all dealership files to
the Ford auditor, and providing Ford with false mailing addresses for its
customers, Metro failed to comply with its franchise agreement with Ford.
Finally, Metro contended that the Board abused its discretion by order-
ing termination for good cause in the absence of evidence that Metro
might not perform well as a dealer in the future. The court rejected this
argument because the statute mandated evaluation of existing circum-
stances, not what kind of relationship the manufacturer and dealer might
have in the future. Moreover, the court found that Metro's pattern of
CPA program abuse and admitted efforts to deceive Ford violated the
basic and fundamental precepts of the relationship between a manufac-
turer and dealer and supported the conclusion that Metro probably
would not perform according to the terms of the agreement if allowed to
remain a dealer.
Although the Board found good cause for termination, it ordered sale
of the franchise by Metro to a buyer suitable to Ford and Freightliner.
Freightliner and Ford argued that the Board had no authority to place
conditions on the termination of Metro's franchise once Ford had estab-
lished good cause for termination. Freightliner argued the Board had no
power to compel it to treat Metro as a franchise dealer or to condition
termination on the finding of a buyer. The court held that the Motor
Vehicle Code did not authorize the Board to condition termination on a
manufacturer's finding a third party to purchase the terminated franchise
at an appraised value. To the contrary, said the court, the Code envisions
a termination followed by establishment of a new franchise within a rea-
sonable time. Having concluded there was substantial evidence to sup-
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port the Board's finding of good cause to terminate Metro and that the
Board's imposition of conditions was unlawful, the appellate court af-
firmed the district court's judgment that the remedy imposed by the
Board was unlawful.
In David McDavid Nissan v. Subaru of Am., 64 an automobile dealer-
ship sued an automobile manufacturer alleging that the manufacturer re-
neged on an oral agreement consenting to relocation. McDavid owned
and operated a Subaru dealership and an Oldsmobile dealership in Hous-
ton. Subaru's regional vice president orally consented to relocation of
the Oldsmobile dealership. The dealer renovated the location and moved
his Oldsmobile dealership there in preparation for moving the Subaru
dealership to the Oldsmobile location. The manufacturer then informed
the dealer that Subaru would not consent to such a move. The dealer
terminated the dealership and two other Subaru dealerships it owned and
sued Subaru for refusing to permit relocation, alleging violations of the
Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code, breach of contract, breach of
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act ("DTPA").
Subaru moved for summary judgment asserting that the dealer was
barred, as a matter of law, from bringing its claims because it failed to
raise them before the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission ("TMVC"). The
trial court granted Subaru summary judgment.
The court of appeals held that the primary jurisdiction of the TMVC to
determine the propriety of denials of written requests to relocate dealer-
ships under the TMVC Code did not encompass oral relocation requests.
Because the dealer asserted that Subaru orally agreed to an oral request
to relocate the dealership and then wrongfully rescinded its agreement,
Section 5.02(15), which limits the rights of manufacturers to deny or with-
hold approval of written requests to relocate, did not apply. Because an
oral relocation request did not contradict any requirement of the Code,
or implicate any rights or obligations under Section 5.02(15), Subaru's
disposition of such request could not, as a matter of law, constitute a vio-
lation of the Code. The court also found that the exclusivity provision of
the Code contravened the open courts provision of the Constitution to
the extent that it abrogated dealership claims for breach of oral contract
and promissory estoppel without substituting other remedies.
With reference to the dealer's DTPA cause of action, the court held
that Section 6.06(a) of the Code required that the TMVC find a violation
before the dealer could sue in district court. Section 6.06(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law .... in addition to the
other remedies provided by this subchapter, a person who has sus-
tained actual damages as a result of a violation of [Section 5.01 or
Section 5.02 of this Act] may maintain an action pursuant to the
terms of Subchapter E, Chapter 17, Business & Commerce Code or
any successor statute thereto and shall be entitled to all procedures
164. 10 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. granted).
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and remedies provided for therein. In any action brought under this
section, and in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency, a judg-
ment rendered pursuant to this section shall pay due deference to the
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Commission contained
in a final order which forms the basis of the action.165
The court held that because the TMVC had primary jurisdiction to de-
termine whether a Code violation occurred, before maintaining its DTPA
cause of action in district court, the dealer was required to present its
claim to the TMVC and obtain findings that Subaru violated the Code.
With reference to the dealer's claim of breach of duty of good faith and
fair dealing, the court held that because the legislature did not specify
that a claimant must obtain a TMVC finding that the Code was violated
before it could pursue a cause of action for breach of duty of good faith
and fair dealing, and because the Code expressly stated this claim was
actionable in tort, the dealer was not required to present this claim to
TMVC before pursuing it in court.
Subaru asserted that the dealer had elected its remedy by pursuing a
voluntary termination of the dealership and accepting benefits under the
termination proceeding in the form of a monetary payment from Subaru.
Subaru argued that, because the dealer accepted the final check for re-
purchase of dealership assets, it was estopped from complaining that
Subaru's refusal to allow relocation was unlawful. Under the Code, upon
termination of a dealership, a manufacturer must repurchase from a deal-
ership its inventory, parts, signs, tools, and equipment within a specified
period of time.166 This obligation is statutory and not contingent on any
finding of breach or fault by either party. Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the election of remedies doctrine did not apply, and a termi-
nated dealer could accept payments under the statute for repurchase of
dealership assets without relinquishing its right to pursue common law
and statutory causes of action against the manufacturer. The court also
concluded that the dealer was not estopped to sue the manufacturer by
accepting payments under the termination provisions.
With regard to the dealer's claim for breach of the written dealership
agreement, the court found that summary judgment for Subaru was
proper. Section 14 of the dealership agreement unambiguously required
Subaru's consent to, among other things, any "relocation of facilities or
establishment of facilities. ' 167 Section 14 further provided that consent
or denial was within Subaru's sole discretion. The dealer admitted that
he was not claiming Subaru breached the dealer agreement; instead, he
was claiming Subaru breached an oral agreement to allow him to relocate
the dealership. Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that sum-
mary judgment for Subaru was correct.
165. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
166. Id. § 5.02(b)(16)(B-E).
167. David McDavid, 10 S.W.3d at 72.
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With regard to the dealer's claim for breach of an oral contract, Subaru
claimed that no consideration existed for the alleged oral contract. How-
ever, because Subaru failed to prove this as a matter of law, summary
judgment was improper on that basis. Likewise, because Subaru did not
show that it would be unjust, as a matter of law, to refuse to enforce its
oral promise, summary judgment was not appropriate on the dealer's
promissory estoppel claim. Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Subaru on the dealer's
breach of written contract and DTPA causes of action and reversed sum-
mary judgment on the dealer's other causes of action.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Butnaru,168 a prospective dealer sued Ford alleg-
ing Ford interfered with agreements it had entered into to buy a car deal-
ership. Graff Ford had a dealership in Del Rio, Texas. The dealership
agreement provided that if Graff Ford proposed to transfer the dealer-
ship, Ford had a right of first refusal. 169 The prospective dealer entered
into a purchase and sale agreement with Graff Ford to buy the dealership
conditioned upon approval by Ford. Ford gave notice of intent to exer-
cise its right of first refusal and assigned its right of first refusal to an
existing Ford dealer.1 70
The prospective dealer then sued Ford for tortiously interfering with
the sale agreement and sought a declaration that the right of first refusal
was unenforceable. 171 The district court granted a temporary injunc-
tion.172 The prospective dealer asserted three causes of action. First, he
alleged Ford tortiously interfered with the sale agreement by attempting
to exercise its right of first refusal. Second, he alleged the existing dealer
breached the sale agreement by refusing to convey the dealership. Third,
he sought a declaration that the right of first refusal was
unenforceable. 73
The prospective dealer argued that the right of first refusal conflicted
with Section 5.01(b), which forbade Ford from rejecting a proposed buyer
unless the buyer was not qualified, and Section 5.02(b)(A), which makes
it unlawful for a manufacturer to fail to give effect or attempt to prevent a
sale of a dealership except as provided in Section 5.01(b) notwithstanding
the terms of any agreement. 174 Ford argued that the Board had exclusive
original jurisdiction because the crux of the prospective dealer's com-
plaint was that the right of first refusal was invalid because it conflicted
with the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code. 175
The court concluded that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over
the prospective dealer's claims to the extent they were based upon viola-
168. 18 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. granted).
169. Id. at 764.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 764-65.
173. Id. at 765-66.




tions of the Act.176 The Board did not have the power to grant the pro-
spective dealer any relief because it applied only to existing (not
prospective) dealers. Nevertheless, the Board did have authority to in-
vestigate and adjudicate violations of the Act and make incidental find-
ings essential to the granting of relief.177 However, the court held the Act
does not abrogate all causes of action that might arise in the context of
motor vehicle distribution. To the extent the prospective dealer's claims
were not based on violations of the Act, the trial court had jurisdiction
over the prospective dealer's common law claims. The court allowed the
prospective dealer to sue Ford for breach of contract, tortious interfer-
ence, and for a declaratory judgment.
VII. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Generally, a franchisor is not vicariously liable for the negligence of a
franchisee unless the franchisor has the right to control the work from
vhich the claim arises. The essential issue is whether the franchisor has
the right to control both the means and details of the process by which
the alleged agent is to accomplish his task. In Risner v. McDonald's
Corp.,178 Risner, a customer who was attending a birthday party at Mc-
Donald's, was sprayed with pepper spray.179 She sued McDonald's Cor-
poration, McDonald's Restaurants of Texas, Inc., Danrose Management
Company, Danrose Corporation, and the manager. 180 The McDonald's
and Danrose entities filed motions for summary judgment on the basis
that none of them was the owner or occupier of the premises. McDon-
ald's, the franchisor, supported its motion with affidavits that it did not
own the restaurant, operate the restaurant, participate in its management,
have the right to hire, discharge, or discipline employees, pay utilities at
the restaurant, sell any product at the restaurant, sell any product to the
restaurant, or hold the right to control the day-to-day activities necessary
to carry on the business of the restaurant. Risner pointed to evidence
that the franchisor (1) was an additional insured on the franchisee's insur-
ance policy; (2) reserved the right to terminate the franchisee's right to
use the McDonald's system and the name; (3) had the right to approve
any assignee or sub-assignee; and (4) retained ownership of certain prop-
erty in connection with the restaurant including the real estate, leasehold
improvements, utility deposits, accounts, notes, receivables, vehicles, of-
fice supplies, certificates of deposit and investment securities, prepaid ex-
pense, the in-store processor, Texas Instrument terminals, and time
recorders.18 1 The court of appeals held that, because the franchisor did
not retain control over the activities concerning which Risner had as-
serted negligence, the trial court did not err in granting the franchisor
176. Id. at 767.
177. Id. at 768.
178. 18 S.W.3d 903 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. denied).
179. Id. at 905-06.
180. Id. at 905.




Summary judgment for a franchisor was again entered in Johnson v.
Burger King Corp.,183 a suit alleging personal injuries from the collapse
of a chair in a Burger King restaurant. Johnson argued that summary
judgment for Burger King was improper because the franchise agreement
between Burger King and the franchisee established that Burger King
controlled the franchisee or attempted to do so insufficiently and negli-
gently.184 Johnson alleged that Burger King was negligent in (1) operat-
ing a public establishment in an unsafe manner; (2) failing to maintain
furniture in a safe manner; (3) failing to keep a proper lookout and dis-
cover defects in equipment or furniture; (4) failing to adequately warn
and protect customers from hidden dangers; (5) failing to act prudently
under the circumstances; and (6) such other acts of negligence as might
be shown at trial.185 Johnson did not allege any theory of vicarious liabil-
ity against Burger King for the acts of the franchisee as its agent. The
franchise agreement between Burger King and the franchisee stated that
the franchisee was an independent contractor and not an agent of Burger
King and that Burger King had no control over the terms and conditions
of employment of the franchisee's employees. 186 It also required the
franchisee to exhibit on the premises notification that the restaurant was
operated by an independent operator and not by Burger King. Johnson
argued that Burger King was liable for his injuries because the franchise
agreement provided that the restaurant would be constructed and im-
proved in a manner authorized and approved by Burger King, the ap-
pearance of the franchise restaurant would not be altered except as
approved by Burger King, and the franchisee was required to maintain
the restaurant in good condition and make all improvements, alterations,
and remodeling reasonably necessary to reflect the current Burger King
restaurant image.1 87 Under the agreement, Burger King had the right to
order repairs, but the obligation to maintain the property remained in the
franchisee as independent contractor. Johnson produced no summary
judgment evidence that Burger King actually ordered any repairs to be
made to the furniture in the restaurant where Johnson was injured. Bur-
ger King provided its franchisees with a manual of operating data which
described in detail how the franchisee should operate the Burger King
restaurant, gave Burger King the right to inspect and supplied extensive
image standards that included removing damaged furniture. Because
Johnson produced no evidence of a right of control nor actual exercise of
control over the broken chair, the court found that summary judgment
182. Id. at 907.
183. No. 09-99-548-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5513 (Beaumont Aug. 17, 2000, pet.
denied) (not designated for publication).
184. Id. at *5-*6.
185. Id. at *8.
186. Id. at *8-*9.
187. Id. at *9-*10.
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for Burger King was proper.188
Summary judgment for a franchisor was reversed in Walters v. Ramada
Franchise Sys., Inc.189 In that case, Walters was raped while trying to
enter her hotel room. She sued the owner of the premises, the franchisor,
the franchisor's parent company, and two holding companies. Under the
terms of the franchise agreement, Ramada had the "unlimited right to
conduct unannounced inspections" and reinspections. 190 The stated pur-
pose of the inspections was for "ascertaining compliance with system
standards."'191 Ramada required all guest room to have certain types of
locks, required the locks to operate correctly, and required a certain level
of exterior lighting. The franchisee could be removed from the reserva-
tions system or terminated if standards were not met. The Ramada Inn
where the rape occurred failed quality assurance inspections both before
and after the rape, eventually resulting in termination of the franchise.
Because the record allegedly contained evidence that Ramada retained
control over lighting and security at the Ramada Inn, the court held that
summary judgment for Ramada was improper.192 The court also re-
versed summary judgment against plaintiff on her DTPA, fraud, and
agency claims because she presented summary judgment evidence sup-
porting the elements of reliance and producing cause, the only elements
Ramada attacked in its no-evidence motion for summary judgment. 193
VIII. CONTRACT CLAIMS
Franchisees continue to assert breach of contract claims against
franchisors and vice versa. In D.G. Bros., Inc. v. Pizza Inn, Inc.,194 Pizza
Inn, Inc., and Pizza Inn Advertising Plan ("PIAP") sued Brothers for
breach of its franchise agreement, seeking amounts due for royalties and
advertising. The trial court awarded partial summary judgment in favor
of Pizza Inn, Inc., and PIAP. Brothers brought a counterclaim against
Pizza Inn, Inc., alleging tortious interference and breach of contract re-
garding a proposed sale of the franchise. The jury found Pizza Inn, Inc.,
had breached the franchise agreement and awarded damages to Broth-
ers.195 The trial court granted Pizza Inn, Inc.'s motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict and rendered judgment for Pizza Inn, Inc., and
PIAP in accordance with the partial summary judgment. 196 Although
Brothers did not challenge its liability to Pizza Inn, Inc., or PIAP or the
amounts claimed to be owing, it raised affirmative defenses of modifica-
188. Id. at *12.
189. No. 05-97-02162-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5673 (Dallas Aug. 24, 2000, no pet.)
(not designated for publication).
190. Id. at *8.
191. Id.
192. Id. at *1, *8.
193. Id. at *2, *12.
194. No. 06-98-00151-CV, 2000 WL 16470 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Jan. 12, 2000, pet.
denied) (not designated for publication).




tion, excuse, payment, offset, and release. Brothers contended that Pizza
Inn, Inc., and others wrongfully interfered with the consummation of a
proposed sale of the franchise. Brothers also sought reversal of the trial
court's granting of Pizza Inn's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict after the jury awarded $46,000 to Brothers against Pizza Inni' 97
The appellate court affirmed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict
because Brothers produced no evidence to support its claim for lost
profits. 198
In Glazner v. Haase,199 a contract to sell a franchise was held to be
unenforceable under the statute of frauds. Haase owned a Whataburger
franchise in the Longview area. Glazner came to work for Haase. Haase
promised to sell his franchise to Glazner. The negotiations were set forth
in three letters to Whataburger. Whataburger never granted Glazner a
franchise. Glazner left Haase's employ and sued him for breach of con-
tract, unjust enrichment, fraud, and fraudulent inducement. Haase
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the alleged con-
tract was unenforceable under the statute of frauds; (2) the fraud claims
were barred by the statute of frauds; (3) Glazner was unable to prove that
there was a valid contract; and (4) there was no cause of action for unjust
enrichment. 200 The court held that the contract did not satisfy the statute
of frauds because it was not supported by consideration and that it was
only a "tentative agreement" or "an agreement in principal" showing
ongoing negotiations, not a binding agreement.20 1 The court affirmed the
trial court's summary judgment against Glazner's breach of contract
claim but reversed summary judgment on the fraud and fraudulent in-
ducement causes of action.202
In Ford Motor Co. v. Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc.,203 the court of ap-
peals reversed a summary judgment for the franchisor because the
franchisor failed to move for summary judgment on the basis that the
franchisee had breached the franchise agreement. Metro was a licensed
motor vehicle dealership authorized to sell Ford trucks. Ford had a CPA
pricing system that reduced the dealer's cost of trucks based on the infor-
mation that the dealer provided to Ford. To get increased CPA on partic-
ular transactions, Metro provided Ford with incorrect names of customers
who were purchasing certain trucks. When Ford discovered Metro's mis-
representations, it threatened to terminate the franchise. Metro re-
sponded by suing Ford and filing a protest with the Texas Motor Vehicle
197. Id. at *6.
198. Id. at *6-*7.
199. No. 06-99-00069-CV, 2000 WL 1062579 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Aug. 4, 2000, pet.
filed) (not designated for publication).
200. Id. Haase also moved for summary judgment on the ground that the other defen-
dant to the suit, PRU Investments, was not a proper party because Glazner could not
prove any basis for piercing the corporate veil.
201. Id. at *3.
202. Id. at *34.
203. No. 05-99-00031-CV, 1999 WL 1126280 (Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 9, 1999, no pet.)
(not designated for publication).
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Board (TMVB) contesting Ford's proposed franchise termination and
chargeback.204
Ford moved for summary judgment on Metro's breach of contract
claim, asserting that Metro's claims were barred as a matter of law by
Metro's misrepresentations in connection with Ford's CPA program that
conclusively established Ford's right to terminate and chargeback the ex-
cess amounts. Because Ford never moved for summary judgment on that
basis, the appellate court could not affirm summary judgment for Ford. 20 5
Metro sought summary judgment on the ground that Section
5.02(b)(14) of the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code barred all
Ford's damage claims as a matter of law.20 6 Section 5.02(b)(14) precludes
a manufacturer from requiring a dealer to pay or assume any part of any
refund, rebate, discount, or other financial adjustment made by the man-
ufacturer to, or in favor of, any customer of a dealer, unless the dealer
voluntarily agrees. 20 7 Ford contended that this section did not apply to its
right to recover damages for discounts obtained by fraud. The court held
that, because the summary judgment evidence did not conclusively estab-
lish Ford's CPA program provided a benefit to or in favor of Metro's
customers, Metro was not entitled to summary judgment. The appellate
court affirmed the trial court's judgment that Metro recover nothing on
its breach of contract claim and reversed the trial court's judgment in
favor of Metro on Ford's breach of contract, fraud, and RICO claims.
208
IX. DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
In Arguello v. Concoc, Inc.,209 the 5th Circuit held that although Co-
noco, Inc. might be liable for the alleged acts of racial discrimination by
employees at stores that it owned, it was not liable for such acts by em-
ployees of independent Conoco-branded stores because there was no
agency relationship with those stores. This suit was brought by plaintiffs
of African American and Hispanic decent who alleged that, when they
were customers at Conoco stores, on several different occasions, they en-
dured racially derogatory remarks and substandard and disparate treat-
ment by store employees. One of the stores at which the alleged
treatment occurred was owned by Conoco, but the other stores were in-
dependently owned by third parties who had entered into Petroleum
Marketing Agreements ("PMA's") with Conoco, allowing them to mar-
ket and sell Conoco-brand gasoline and supplies. Plaintiffs sought to
hold Conoco liable for their alleged discrimination.
204. Id. at *1.
205. Id. at *4.
206. Id. at *7.
207. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 5.02(b)(14) (Vernon 1976 & Supp.
2001).
208. Ford Motor Co., 1999 WL 1126280, at *9.
209. 207 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub. nom, Escobedo v. Conoco, Inc., 121
S. Ct. 177, 69 U.S.L.W. 3729 (2000).
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The Supreme Court has determined that, to hold a defendant liable
under section 1981 for the discriminatory actions of a third party, there
must be an agency relationship between the defendant and the third
party. 210 The Fifth Circuit stated that "to establish an agency relationship
between Conoco, Inc. and the branded stores the plaintiffs must show
that Conoco, Inc. has given consent for the branded stores to act on its
behalf and that the branded stores are subject to the control of Conoco,
Inc."1211 The PMA's entered into between the independently owned
stores and Conoco provided that each branded store ("Marketer") "is an
independent business and is not, nor are its employees, employees of Co-
noco. Conoco and Marketer are completely separate entities. They are
not partners, general partners ... nor agents of each other in any sense
whatsoever and neither has the power to obligate or bind each other. '212
The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that because the PMA's allowed
Conoco to (a) require branded-stores to treat customers fairly, honestly,
and courteously, and (b) conduct random bi-annual inspections of the
business, Conoco controlled details of the daily operations of the Co-
noco-branded stores. The Fifth Circuit held, as a matter of law, that there
was no agency relationship between Conoco and the Conoco-brand
stores.
The court refused, however, to grant a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs'
claims for alleged discriminatory conduct by employees of stores owned
and operated by Conoco. The court noted that when considering
whether an employee's acts are within the scope of employment, some of
the factors to be considered are: (1) time, place, and purpose of the act;
(2) its similarity to acts which the employee is authorized to perform; (3)
whether the act is commonly performed by employees; (4) the extent of
departure from normal methods; and (5) whether the employer would
reasonably expect such act would be performed.2 13 The court determined
that it could not determine, as a matter of law, that the alleged conduct of
the employee was in the course and scope of his employment, so it denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment on this point.
In Mays v. TSI Staffing, Inc.,214 the district court granted the
franchisor's motion to dismiss a section 1985(3) claim that franchisor had
conspired with a franchisee to deprive African-American employees and
customers of their rights. The employee of a franchisee complained that
franchisee had discriminated against him and had reserved certain sub-
standard rooms for African-American guests, and that franchisor failed
to respond to these issues. The court found that the licensing agreement
prohibited such discriminatory acts and that there was not sufficient
210. Id. at 807 (citing Gen. Bldg. Contractors Assoc. v. Pa. United Eng'rs and Construc-
tors, 458 U.S. 375, 393 (1982)).
211. Id. at 807.
212. Id. at 807-08 (omission in text).
213. Id. at 810 (citing Domar Ocean Transp., Ltd. v. Indep. Ref. Co., 783 F.2d 1185,
1190 (5th Cir. 1986)).
214. 56 F. Supp. 2d 738 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
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pleading or any evidence that franchisor even knew of any alleged dis-
criminatory acts by franchisee. The court held that plaintiff had failed to
present facts upon which the court could find that co-defendant Days
Inns of America, Inc. was engaged in a conspiracy with its franchisee, and
it dismissed plaintiff's action against the franchisor.215
X. ANTITRUST
The Supreme Court's decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Techni-
cal Servs., Inc.21 6 still provides the analysis by which a court will review
cases involving tying arrangements, and it is still a source for substantial
litigation with regard to franchising practices that require a franchisee to
utilize or purchase specific supplies or sources. Since Kodak, the issue of
whether the franchisor supply arrangements were disclosed pre-contract
or implemented as a post-contractual restriction often determines the
outcome of an antitrust case.
In Chawla v. Shell Oil Co., 217 plaintiffs, retail gasoline dealers, brought
suit against Shell alleging various antitrust violations. Specifically, plain-
tiffs alleged that Shell's requirement that the plaintiffs (franchisees) util-
ize and lease its "pay-at-the-pump" credit card machines constituted
illegal tying.218 In holding that no tying arrangement existed, the court
held that neither Shell Gasoline, nor the Shell trademark, are legally rec-
ognized unique products for antitrust purposes.219
Also in Chawla, plaintiffs complained that the "pay-at-the-pump" con-
dition was forcing them out of business because they were "locked in" to
these policies in order to continue their supply of Shell gasoline. 220 The
court found that the "lock in" theory was inapplicable and that plaintiffs
had a "pre-existing and continuing contractual relationship [ ] with [the]
[d]efendant[ ].-1221 The court concluded that Shell was merely exercising
its contractual rights and was not attempting to assert "market power"
over a viable relevant market product.222
In Subsolutions, Inc. v. Doctor's Assocs., Inc.,223 the court found that
plaintiff had satisfied the elements of a tying claim and that plaintiff was
"locked in" to the franchise agreements. In Subsolutions, plaintiff sold
"point-of-sale" (POS) computer systems to a chain of fast-food franchises
(Subway Sandwich Shops). One of the defendants sold and serviced Sub-
way Sandwich Shop franchises. 224 The franchisor's requirement that the
Subway Sandwich Shop franchisees purchase a particular POS system
215. Id. at 741.
216. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
217. 75 F. Supp. 2d 626 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
218. Id. at 634.
219. Id. at 639 n.13.
220. Id. at 637.
221. Id. at 638.
222. Id. at 642.
223. 62 F. Supp. 2d 616 (D. Conn. 1999).
224. Id. at 619.
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from a single vendor constituted an illegal tying and antitrust conspir-
acy.225 In finding that the plaintiff satisfied the elements of the tying
claim, the court held that the Subway trademark and the POS system
were two distinct products with two distinct product markets. 226 The
court further found that plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to make out
a "lock-in" claim.227 In holding that plaintiff could continue with a lock-
in claim, the court found that Subway did not require the plaintiff to use
the defendant's POS systems until after they were "locked in" to these
franchise agreements. 228 The court further found that the plaintiff had
satisfied the liberal pleading requirements by alleging that defendant's
tying arrangement had forced franchisees to purchase defendant's POS,
despite the fact that many of the franchisees preferred other POS sys-
tems.229 In concluding that the plaintiff had actually been harmed by de-
fendant's actions, the court found that by requiring purchases exclusively
from defendant, other competitive point-of-sale system vendors who
were capable of providing systems to Subway franchisees were injured.230
XI. FRANCHISING ON THE INTERNET
Franchisors utilizing agreements which predate the boom in Internet
marketing and selling should be particularly concerned about provisions
which grant exclusive territories. Franchisors who market and sell on the
Internet may run afoul of exclusive territory provisions and open them-
selves up to encroachment claims. In a recent arbitration matter, Empo-
rium Drug Mart, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc.,231 the Arbitration Panel
decided two to one to grant franchisees' application for a preliminary in-
junction against the franchisor based on franchisees' internet encroach-
ment claims. The franchisees alleged that the franchisor's internet
operations violated the franchisees' exclusive territory as provided in the
franchise agreement. The franchisor's website included such taglines as
"Your neighborhood pharmacy for over 20 years." The franchisor ar-
gued, unsuccessfully, that it was not considered as a store but an alterna-
tive form of distribution. The injunction provided Drug Emporium with
a phase out period with which to shut down the operations that violated
of the franchisees' contractual rights of exclusivity.
Internet encroachment will likely be a growing concern for franchisors.
Franchisors should examine their franchise agreements to insure that no
internet activities are in violation of any exclusivity provisions in
franchise agreements. Franchisors who intend to engage in internet oper-
ations should ensure that new franchise agreements will permit such
activities.
225. Id. at 627, 628.
226. Id. at 623-24.
227. Id. at 626.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 627.
230. Id. at 628.
231. American Arbitration (Dallas, Texas), Case No. 711140012600.
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XII. REMEDIES: DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. THE LANHAM Ac'
The Lanham Act was enacted to provide protections to businesses
from false, misleading, and/or deceptive practices by its competitors. Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act addressed the issue of false advertising in a
commercial setting.232 When an action under Section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act is brought, to establish a prima facia case of false advertising the
plaintiff must prove the five elements set forth in Taquino v. Teledyne
Monarch Rubber.2 33 Failure to do so can be fatal to plaintiff's claim.
In Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc.,234 the Fifth Circuit issued a
significant opinion under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Pizza Hut
complained of Papa John's $300 million advertising campaign, which was
built around the tag line, "Better Ingredients. Better Pizza. '235 In Pizza
Hut's view, Papa John's tag line was false on its face. Pizza Hut com-
plained that Papa John's claim was particularly egregious when used in
certain ads comparing the two pizza-mongers' tomato sauce and
dough.236 Pizza Hut introduced evidence that there was no substantive
difference in the products when they went into the oven or in the taste
test, and the jury found that the statements in Papa John's ads were mis-
leading though literally true.2 37 The trial court concluded that the mis-
leading ads-even though they numbered only a small portion of the
total campaign-had so tainted the slogan that it enjoined the slogan's
further use. 238
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the slogan "Better Ingredi-
ents. Better Pizza," standing alone, was non-actionable puffery because it
was not an objectifiable statement of fact on which consumers could justi-
fiably rely.239 But the court did find sufficient evidence to support the
232. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125, provides in relevant
part:
Any person who ... in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, quality, or geographic origin of his or her or an-
other persons goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a
civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (1994).
233. 893 F.2d 1488 (5th Cir. 1990). A prima facia case of false advertising under Section
43(a) requires the plaintiff to establish: (1) a false or misleading statement of fact about a
product; (2) such statement either deceived, or had the capacity to deceive, a substantial
segment of potential customers; (3) the deception is material in that it is likely to influence
the consumer's purchasing decision; (4) the product is in interstate commerce; and (5) the
plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result of the statement at issue. Id. at 1500.
234. 227 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2000).
235. Id. at 491.
236. Id. at 492 ("[Our sauce is] is made with 'fresh, vine-ripened tomatoes;' ... [theirs
is] remanufactured tomato paste." "[For our dough, we give yeast] several days to work its
special magic ... [while theirs is] frozen dough ....." "[We use] clear, filtered water ... [as
opposed to] whatever comes out of the tap.").
237. Id. at 492-93.
238. Id. at 493-94.
239. Id. at 498-99.
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jury's verdict that the sauce and dough ads were misleading, and it held
that when used in conjunction with those ads, the slogan became objectifi-
able and misleading, because it gave consumers two objectifiable (and
wrong) reasons to conclude Papa John's pizza was "better. '240
The court observed, however, that in order to be actionable under Sec-
tion 43(a), misrepresentations must be material-that is, they must effect
the consumer's purchasing decision.241 Where a statement is literally
false on its face, materiality is presumed, but where falsity is merely im-
plied, the plaintiff must present evidence. The court found no evidence
that the slogan and the tendency to deceive consumers would effect
purchasing decisions; thus, Pizza Hut failed to produce evidence of a Lan-
ham Act violation, and the court remanded the case with instructions to
enter judgment for the defendant Papa John's. 242
In the past year, the Fifth Circuit also addressed the standards which
should be applied to a claim brought under the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act ("FTDA"), an amendment to the Lanham Act. In Westchester
Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc.,243 PRL USA Holdings, Inc. ("Polo")
brought suit against a magazine publisher to prohibit its use of the word
"POLO" as a title to one of the magazines it published. 244 Polo alleged
that its mark was famous and distinctive and that Westchester had
adopted and diluted the Polo mark. 245 Westchester, relying on a recent
Fourth Circuit opinion, argued that proof of dilution under the FTDA
required "actual, consummated harm. '246 On the other hand, Polo con-
tended that the FFDA requires only proof of the likelihood of dilution.247
In endorsing the Fourth Circuit's holding that the FTDA requires proof
of actual harm, the Fifth Circuit held that "proof of actual harm ... best
accords with the plain meaning of the statute. '248 The Fifth Circuit found
that the "likelihood of dilution" or threatened use of a mark is insuffi-
cient to support a dilution claim.249 The court further held that the
FFDA prohibits any commercial use of a famous mark that actually
"causes dilution," not a possibility or likelihood of dilution.250
B. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
Many franchise agreements stipulate that a franchisor may recover liq-
uidated damages for a franchisee's breach of contract. These liquidated
damages clauses are generally enforceable, unless proven to be a penalty
240. Id. at 501-02.
241. Id. at 502.
242. Id. at 503-04.
243. 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
244. Id. at 660.
245. Id. at 661, 669.
246. Id. at 670 (citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999)).
247. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1999).
248. Westchester, 214 F.3d at 670.
249. Id. at 670-71.




While no Texas or Fifth Circuit cases address the availability of liqui-
dated damages in franchise cases, courts in other jurisdictions have ad-
dressed the enforceability of such clauses and have come to differing
results.252
In Days Inn of Am., Inc. v. Patel,253 the franchise agreement contained
a liquidated damages clause that the franchisor (Days Inn) could invoke
in the event the franchisee breached the contract. In holding that the
liquidated damages clause was enforceable, the court examined whether
the clause was "reasonable under the totality of the circumstances" and
whether the clause could be viewed as punitive in nature.254 The court
looked to the express language of the clause which provided that the liq-
uidated damages were not a penalty; therefore, the franchisee was es-
topped from arguing that the clause was punitive.255
While the liquidated damages provision in Days Inn was held to be
valid, in Honey Dew Assocs., Inc. v. M & K Food Corp.,256 the court
found a liquidated damages clause was an unenforceable penalty. While
the court acknowledged that "considerable deference is given to the par-
ties' reasonable determination of liquidated damages," the court still has
discretion in determining whether the clause is enforceable.2 57 The court
found that the liquidated damages provision, as an acceleration clause,
was an unenforceable penalty under Massachusetts law.258
C. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Termination does not necessarily mark the end of the franchisor/fran-
chisee relationship. Often an involuntarily terminated franchisee may re-
fuse to remove signage, promotional materials, or other items which
identify the franchisee with the franchise system. Injunctions are an im-
portant remedy to help prevent public confusion and dilution of the
franchisor's marks.259 The Lanham Act provides the federal statutory
251. Thanksgiving Tower Partners v. Anros Thanksgiving Partners, 64 F.3d 227 (5th
Cir. 1995).
252. See Days Inns of Am., Inc. v. Patel, 88 F. Supp. 2d 928 (C.D. Ill. 2000); Honey Dew
Assocs., Inc. v. M & K Food Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 352 (D.R.I. 2000).
253. 88 F. Supp. 2d 928 (C.D. 11. 2000).
254. Id. at 935-36.
255. Id. at 936.
256. 81 F. Supp. 2d 352 (D.R.I. 2000).
257. Id. at 357.
258. Id. at 358.
259. The intent of the Lanham Act is to:
regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the
deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; . . . to protect
persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent
fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies,
counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks ....
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V 1999). See also Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d
500, 503 (9th Cir. 1991).
2001] 1517
SMU LAW REVIEW
foundation for injunctions against terminated franchisees. 260 Three po-
tential claims are available to a franchisor under the Lanham Act when
there is a continued, unauthorized use of its marks. Under section 32(1),
the commercial use of a registered mark that "is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive" and that is "without consent of the
registrant" forms the basis of a Lanham Act claim.261 On the other hand,
section 43(a) protects both registered and unregistered marks and makes
unlawful "false designation of origin, false or misleading description of
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-[A] is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to ... the origin,
sponsorship or approval of" goods or services. 262 Finally, section 43(c)
prohibits a party from using and diluting the quality of another party's
famous and distinctive marks.263
To obtain a preliminary injunction, many courts require a franchisor to
establish the following elements of the so-called "traditional" test: (1)
there is a substantial likelihood that the franchisor will prevail on the
merits; (2) the franchisor will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is
not granted; (3) the injury to the franchisor greatly outweighs any injury
the franchisee may suffer under the injunction; and (4) any injunction
would not be adverse to the public interest.264 Other courts may apply an
260. The Lanham Act expressly provides for injunctive relief to prevent infringement.
15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (Supp. V 1999); see also Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846
F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Injunctive relief is the remedy of choice for trademark
and unfair competition cases, since there is no adequate remedy at law for the injury
caused by a [franchisee's] continuing infringement.").
261. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The pertinent part of Section 32
provides that:
(1) any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant - (a) use in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use
is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... shall be
liable in a civil action by the registrant ....
Id.
262. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994). Section 43(a) provides in part, as follows:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services.., uses
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device.... or any false desig-
nation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to ... deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person . . . shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Id. As for unregistered marks, see Controls Int'l, Inc. v. Kinetrol, Ltd., No. 3:97-CV-2504-
D, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4794 at *9 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 1998).
263. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) Supp. IV (1998). Section 43(c) provides, in part, the following:
(c) Remedies for dilution of famous marks.
(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade
name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilu-
tion of the distinctive quality of the mark.
Id.
264. Pappan Enters., Inc. v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 803 (3d Cir. 1998);
Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1979).
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"alternative" test wherein the injunction may be issued if the moving
party demonstrates either: (1) a combination of probable success on the
merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or (2) serious questions
which tip the balance of hardships sharply in the movant's favor.2 65
In Snelling and Snelling, Inc. v. Ryvis, Inc.,266 the franchisor sought a
preliminary injunction to require the franchisee to comply with certain
post-franchise termination obligations under the franchise agreement.2 67
In applying the "traditional" test for obtaining a preliminary injunction,
the court held that the franchisor had failed to establish the irreparable
harm element of the test.2 68 In determining that the franchisor had failed
to establish the elements necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction, the
court found that the irreparable harm element must be satisfied by inde-
pendent proof and that the irreparable harm injury is a "heavy burden to
overcome. "269
In Dunkin' Donuts, Inc. v. Albirch Donuts, Inc.,270 a franchisor sought
a preliminary injunction to require the franchisee to comply with the
health and safety requirements of the franchise agreement. 271 In issuing
the preliminary injunction, the court found that the failure of a franchisee
to follow certain health and safety codes can have a detrimental impact
on a franchisor's name and goodwill, and that such damage is "not readily
quantifiable and, thus, constitutes irreparable harm. '272
One Texas court also dealt with injunctive relief in the context of direct
sales activities. Graham v. Mary Kay, Inc.273 involved a request for in-
junctive relief to enjoin a former Mary Kay salesperson from selling Mary
Kay cosmetics at her retail location after termination. Mary Kay Cosmet-
ics is a manufacturer and distributor of cosmetics under its brand name,
Mary Kay. The Mary Kay system involves marketing cosmetic products
through independent beauty consultants who work out of their homes
and sell to personal customers.274 Graham was a Mary Kay consultant
but was terminated when Mary Kay discovered she was selling Mary Kay
cosmetics at a flea market. After her termination, Graham continued to
sell Mary Kay products at flea markets and in a shopping mall. Because
Graham purchased products from Mary Kay beauty consultants and re-
sold them, Mary Kay asserted that Graham could only acquire Mary Kay
products by inducing Mary Kay's sales representatives to breach their dis-
tribution contracts with Mary Kay that prohibit the sale of its products at
a retail business. The trial court ruled that Graham was liable for tortious
interference with contract and unfair competition, and unauthorized utili-
265. First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987).
266. No. 3:99-CV-2028-D, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17928 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 1999).
267. Id. at *3.
268. Id. at *12.
269. Id. at *6.
270. 96 F. Supp. 2d 146 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
271. Id. at 147.
272. Id. at 149.
273. 25 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
274. Id. at 752.
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zation of the Mary Kay trademark. 275
On appeal, the Court analyzed whether Mary Kay's claims for unfair
competition and unauthorized trademark use could be sustained where
Graham was selling genuine Mary Kay merchandise. The court of ap-
peals stated that a distributor selling genuine merchandise could misap-
propriate a manufacturer's trademark if its use of the trademark mislead
the public about its relationship with the manufacturer. 276 The Texas ap-
pellate court ruled that Graham traded on Mary Kay's goodwill and mar-
keting methods that Mary Kay had built up over the years. In sustaining
the trial court's ruling, the appellate court found that Graham's actions
caused confusion among consumers about whether Mary Kay was ending
its longstanding policy against marketing its products through retail loca-
tions.277 The appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment
and the injunction barring Graham from selling Mary Kay products at her
retail location.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 754.
277. Id.
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